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The Crisis of German Protestantism	<i>Carl Mayer</i>	397
Industrial Relations and the Curriculum	<i>Phillips Bradley</i>	433
Economic Possibilities in the Mountain Regions	<i>Hans Neisser</i>	456
The Nature of Scientific Method	<i>Felix Kaufmann</i>	464
Some Critical Remarks on Man's Science of Man	<i>Kurt Riezler</i>	481
Book Reviews		506
Table of Contents and Indexes for Volume Twelve	<i>after page</i>	522

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## SOCIAL RESEARCH

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# THE CRISIS OF GERMAN PROTESTANTISM

BY CARL MAYER

WHAT will be the intellectual-moral "face" of the Germany of tomorrow? Will she be a Germany traveling along a road that will eventually lead her back into the comity of civilized nations, or will she be a Germany essentially identical with what she has been during the past ten years? Or to put it differently, will Germany remain the intellectual-moral wasteland into which the enormity of National Socialism has turned her, or will she be capable of rising above herself once again, as she has risen before in her history in times of national catastrophe?

We do not know the answer to these questions. But we do know that if a change is to come at all it will ultimately have to be brought about by the spontaneous action of the German people themselves. It must come from within, it cannot be imposed from without. And all rationalistic-utopian notions to the contrary notwithstanding, it is safe to assume also that there is no way of moral-intellectual rebuilding save upon the materials that are provided by Germany's own past. The answer to the question of what kind of Germany will eventually emerge is therefore likely to turn to a large measure upon whether National Socialism succeeded in destroying altogether a tradition which, though different from that of the West, was once both noble and great, or whether there are still left beneath the surface, as it were, remnants or vestiges of that tradition, capable of eventually reasserting themselves.

It would seem to follow that in contrast with the methods that have so far been usually employed in the discussion of the elusive and perplexing so-called "German problem," another method might possibly prove to be useful. I mean the sober historical-sociological analysis of the German intellectual-moral scene as it

presents itself to us today, with the analysis undertaken from the point of view of whether anything can be detected that may eventually serve as an agent of moral regeneration. What is left of the pre-Nazi tradition? To what degree is any such residue affected by the corroding influence of National Socialism and to what degree has it remained intact? What strength or weakness is it likely to develop? Will it have a salutary or a destructive effect upon the future? It is in terms of these questions that one would have to carry out investigations into the manifold forces that have shaped, and the manifold institutions in which there is embodied, what may be called the intellectual-moral world of the German people, if one hopes finally to be able to determine what future is likely or possible.

It is in the very nature of such an approach that it must fail to reach any definitive conclusions. It can provide material for orientation. It can indicate, or at best define, certain possible or probable trends. But which of these trends is to materialize and whether any is to materialize at all, is a problem to which it can have no answer. In short, it cannot, and as attempted in this study does not aim to, predict what the future actually will be. The limitations of the approach are thus obvious, but equally obvious would seem to be its advantages. Because it is a radically empirical approach it cannot take as its point of departure any dogmatic assumptions on the basis of which the answer to the problem to be investigated is anticipated in a foregone conclusion; nor can it be based upon any preconceived notions as regards an alleged definitive relationship—whether conceived of in positive or in negative terms—between things German and things Nazi, preconceptions which constitute a serious barrier to any real scientific grasp of the problem. It rigidly excludes any such assumptions, and in so doing may perhaps be able to open the way to less biased and more objective inquiry.

Within the framework of the suggested approach the study of German Protestantism—both as an intellectual force and as a social institution—holds, I believe, a special interest. The reason for



this lies not merely in the fact that a large majority of the German people adhere to the Protestant faith and may thus theoretically be expected, in however small a measure, to be influenced by it. The more essential reason is that German Protestantism has played a great and fateful role in the intellectual history of the country. It is at the foundation of most of what are the characteristically German intellectual movements, however much these movements may have disassociated themselves from it and even turned against it. Thus it is inextricably interwoven into the texture of the intellectual-moral life of the country, and in this sense, although the numerical and intellectual strength of German Catholicism must not be underestimated, Germany can indeed be said to be a fundamentally Protestant country.

There is an additional reason which would appear to make the study of German Protestantism particularly revealing. German Protestantism, there is no doubt, contributed greatly to that crisis which was to culminate in the catastrophe of National Socialism. Yet when that catastrophe occurred, the very same German Protestantism developed into one of the strongest centers of opposition to National Socialism. It cannot, therefore, be simply grouped either with the category of the pro-Nazi or with the category of the anti-Nazi forces. It is both, or to be more correct, the relationship is of a dialectical rather than a onesided nature. This fact would seem to indicate that an investigation into German Protestantism and its possibilities in the future might throw an especially interesting light on the problem of what kind of Germany will eventually emerge.

In the following pages, then, I propose to address myself to a consideration of what German Protestantism may come to mean for the intellectual-moral future of Germany. I shall do so, first, through an analysis of its structure as we find it prior to National Socialism; on this groundwork it will be possible to describe what happened in the period of National Socialism, and, finally, to consider in rough outline what possible trends can be discerned for the future.

## I

In the effort to apprehend the essential structure of German Protestantism the first fact to be noted is that it has organized itself exclusively on the pattern of an established church. It is this fact that gives it a character of its own and makes it differ from both American and English Protestantism, the former being organized exclusively in free churches and the latter being organized along two lines: establishment and the nonconformist free churches.

It is true that in addition to the established churches of German Protestantism there are free churches as well, but in a discussion of German Protestantism as a whole they can safely be disregarded. They count among their members less than 1 percent of the total population; according to the latest available statistics there were in 1933 less than 600,000 members of free churches as compared with the 41 million members of the established churches. And as for their influence, it does not reach beyond their own borders, and thus is all but negligible. Neither numerically nor in significance can the free churches be considered to constitute an essential factor in the totality of German Protestantism. It is true also that since 1919 a kind of formal disestablishment of all churches has been the law of the land. Yet it must be understood that the legal changes introduced by the Weimar constitution have had but little effect upon German Protestantism. They failed to bring about any change of actual structure. Actually German Protestantism, for all its legal disestablishment, has retained—or at least did until very recently—all the essential sociological features characteristic of establishment.

The term "establishment" is used here not in the strict sense in which it is applied to the Anglican church but in the broader and more general sense in which it denotes a sociological church type. That type is one whose basic structure is determined by the fact that a positive relationship obtains between state and church, with the state an integral part of the church organization and the church an integral part of the political organization of

the country. The state, in providing basic elements of organization for the church, claims within it certain rights and prerogatives. These may be merely in the nature of formal supervision, or they may be far-reaching and affect the very life of the church. In the terminology of church law they may, with varying degrees of intensity, be *jura in sacra*, or they may, again with varying degrees of intensity, be merely *jura circa sacra*. In granting these rights to the state the church in turn is publicly recognized as official, in which position it exercises special rights and enjoys special privileges, both in ecclesiastical and in political matters. These rights and privileges may vary in form and intensity, and may include any or all of the following: special legal protection by the state; political support, moral or material; the guarantee of proper training of the clergy through the establishment of theological faculties at state universities; compulsory religious teaching in the public schools; or, in matters beyond the realm of the church proper, the exercise of a strong influence upon the educational system of the country, which may or may not amount to a monopoly in teaching; the right to be represented in the political bodies of the country; the right to be heard in the affairs of state.

As regards German Protestantism, the general trend since the second half of the nineteenth century has been, as in other countries of establishment, toward greater freedom and autonomy of the church. This trend becomes discernible, for instance, in the Prussian church law of 1876, with its emphasis on the synodal rather than the consistorial factor. It continues to assert itself in various ways in the subsequent decades, finally to culminate in the provisions in the Weimar constitution granting the church formal independence and autonomy. Yet it is important to realize that though the distance between state and church has lengthened, there has not been a radical separation of the two. German Protestantism is still built on the basic rock of a positive relationship between church and state.

Until 1918 this relationship was symbolically expressed in the

episcopacy of the civil ruler, the princes of the various states being the nominal heads of the churches of their territory as well. After 1918 the episcopacy of the civil ruler was abolished, but the relationship between state and church was maintained in the fact that the churches, as *Verbände des öffentlichen Rechts*, remained subject to public rather than to private law. The state, while acknowledging the territory of the church proper as alien to itself, still insisted on the exercise of the *jus circa sacra*, though with a steadily diminishing degree of intensity: until 1918 the rights of the state extended over a still large area of the external organization of the church; after 1918 they were reduced to mere formal supervision. Before 1918 the church, while relinquishing most of its political privileges, retained many in its own field, such as financial support by the state, state-established theological faculties, religious teaching in the public schools; and it is to be noted that for all practical purposes these privileges, despite legal curtailment, were retained after 1918 as well. In short, then, sociologically, if not strictly legally, German Protestantism has remained what it has always been: an established church, concretely organized in the shape of numerous territorial churches (*Landeskirchen*).

The historical-sociological explanation of why German Protestantism organized itself exclusively as an established church constitutes a fascinating and rather baffling problem of church history. Here no more than a fragmentary account of the outlines of the problem can be given.

The negative reason which made for establishment<sup>1</sup> is the predominance in German Protestantism of the Lutheran over the

<sup>1</sup> On the following discussion see Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, vol. 2 (New York 1931) pp. 461 ff., 575 ff.; Rudolf Sohm, *Kirchenrecht*, vol. 1 (Munich-Leipzig 1923) pp. 460 ff.; Walter Köhler, *Luther und das Luthertum* (Leipzig 1933); W. A. Visser 't Hooft and J. H. Oldham, *The Social Function of the Christian Churches* (London 1937) pp. 40 ff.; Otto Hintze, "Die Epochen des evangelischen Kirchenregiments in Preussen," *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 97 (Munich 1906) pp. 67 ff.; Andrew L. Drummond, "Church and State in Protestant Germany, with Special Reference to Prussia," *Church History*, vol. 13, no. 3 (1944) pp. 210 ff.

Calvinist-Reformed tradition. Lutheranism, because of the extreme spiritualism of its conception of the church, not only exhibits a total indifference in matters of church organization but also is of itself incapable of offering any principles upon which the church as a human-social organization can be built. The church, according to Lutheranism, can be only the Church of the Word, built upon the miracle of Scripture. It is constituted by faith in, and governed wholly by the efficacious power of, the Word. For its true nature to be realized nothing is required but the preaching of the Word and the right administration of the sacraments. As the Augsburg Confession has it, the church is "the communion of Saints in which the Gospel is purely taught and the sacraments are rightly administered." In other words, the church is conceived of as a purely spiritual order of love and freedom, and accordingly it neither can nor desires to exercise any power not contained in the spiritual power of the Word.

For this very reason it inevitably followed, however, that the church, if it was to live and survive for any length of time as a human-social organization, had to be sustained by a force from without. Given the particular conditions of the time of the Reformation, this force could only be the political power of the ruling princes. The spiritual order of the church was to be supported by the secular order of the state.

Thus the positive reason which caused German Protestantism to be organized as an established church is the fact that it was the political authorities who actually established it as a human-social, that is, legal-compulsory, church system. It was they who provided the element of coercion necessary for church organization. It was they, in the first place, who supplied the church with a territorial basis. It was they, in the second place, who laid down a system of regulation regarding financial and administrative matters, who created in the consistories the higher organs of ecclesiastical government, and who introduced procedures for induction of the clergy into office. Finally, it was they who were

instrumental in hardening the various theological statements, such as the Augsburg Confession or the Formula of Concord, into publicly binding norms of a quasi-dogmatic nature, thereby providing the doctrinal basis for the protection of the church and the rejection of heresy. What Catholicism achieved by way of a church order considered to be of directly divine origin, that is to say, *jure divino*, what Reformed Protestantism achieved by way of a church order founded upon the divine right of the congregation to order its own affairs, German-Lutheran Protestantism achieved not of its own, but through the instrumentality of the secular government.

The consequence—with a few exceptions in such parts of the country as the Rhineland, where Calvinism prevailed—was the formation of German Protestantism as a territorial church, that is, its formation in an arrangement of a very peculiar nature in which actually, though not in theory, state and church were one, the state being a confessional territory, the church being a half ecclesiastical state. And this proved to be the formative event in the history of the German Protestant church, in so far as its organizational aspect is concerned. The original meaning, and with it the *raison d'être*, of the territorial solution of the church problem was eventually to disappear, for two reasons: first, with the advent of enlightened absolutism the state turned secular; and second, the church suffered a fundamental transformation in its doctrinal foundation as a result of its efforts, from the nineteenth century on, to combine the different confessions of Protestantism in a "united church." Yet the structure raised on the basis of the original meaning of the relationship between state and church was to remain long after the basis itself was gone, and was to acquire a force of its own, strong enough to assert itself against any attempts to bring about an essential change of organization within German Protestantism.

To be sure, attempts to find a solution of the church problem along organizational lines other than those of territorialism were not lacking, either within the church or without. Within the

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church there were, for example, the efforts to establish a radical separation of state and church and thus bring about a "free church in a free state," as was urged in certain passages in the work of Schleiermacher and actively put forward in the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 by the church historian Karl von Haase. And, in a totally different direction, there were the efforts by certain Romantics, such as the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm IV and his friend Friedrich von Bunsen, to remodel the German Protestant church on the analogy of Anglicanism, thereby, it was believed, making it more "catholic" and at the same time more independent and giving it, if not separation, at least a greater degree of freedom from the state. But all such efforts to replace the territorial system proved futile. They remained intellectual movements, failing to establish themselves in social fact.

And as for the attempts—undertaken either to supplement or to replace the territorial church—to lead German Protestantism along the sectarian line of religious communities based upon mere voluntary agreement, the soil again proved too unfavorable for results to materialize that even faintly resembled English nonconformism. Sectarian movements either were ruthlessly suppressed or, as in the case of pietism, were absorbed into the existing church as *ecclesiolae in ecclesia*. What few sectarian groups survived, as for example the Mennonites and the Schwenkfeldians, have failed to make any impress upon the total structure of German Protestantism. There has been no dissent in Germany to speak of.

What is the significance for German Protestantism of the fact that it is organized as an established church? In the first place, within the total configuration of groups and relationships that is called German society, the Protestant church, by virtue of being established, occupies a position of paramount importance. The Protestant church is the church of the land. In formal sociological terminology, the church belongs within the category of "community" rather than in that of "association." One belongs to it in the same way that one is a member of a family or a citizen

of the state. One is born into the church and does not, as a rule, enter it out of one's own free will and accord. To belong to the church is considered a matter of course; not to belong to it is not merely unusual but is still a matter to which the stigma of social disapproval is attached. Indeed, membership in the church is so much taken for granted that even social groups that are scornful of it or actively hostile to it have not severed their formal relationship. The masses of the urban industrial proletariat may consider it a matter of principle not to attend church services, but in the basic events of their lives, such as birth, marriage and death, they are not likely to dispense with the observance, however perfunctory, of the church rituals. Although their Marxist creed would command it, they have not left the church in any large numbers. The intellectual elite may be totally alienated from the church, yet for reasons both of tradition and of respectability they have not formally disassociated themselves from it. The outstanding fact is that *formal* withdrawal from the church is extremely rare. In the whole of Germany the number of persons professing to have no church affiliation (including Catholicism) has hardly ever been more than 5 percent of the total population, despite a rather unfriendly attitude toward the Protestant church by the Weimar republic and despite the openly hostile attitude of National Socialism. In contrast to the approximately 70 million non-church persons in the United States there are about 2 or 3 million in Germany.

Thus it is because of establishment that German Protestantism has formed itself into a sociological factor of the first order, as far as the total arrangement of German society is concerned, and has been kept from being relegated to an insignificant place in it; but it is also due to establishment that German Protestantism has suffered a series of great and grave sociological disadvantages. These derive from the loss of independence both within the church and in the relations of the church with the political powers, and they may be roughly summarized as the dangers of "Erastianism."

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The first of these is the formalism of church life.<sup>2</sup> German Protestantism, despite the grafting of several shoots of formal autonomy on the tree of establishment, has been unable to impart to the church that genuine freedom which comes from real self-government. And having failed to do so, it has consequently to a large degree failed also to provide the material from which could be built within the church the creativity and spontaneity of a common life of fellowship. The laity remains passively indifferent, because it lacks the opportunity—presented for instance by the presbyterian system—of learning to cultivate cooperation and thus to develop a sense of self-responsibility and self-discipline in church affairs; the clergy tends to develop into a mere state-church bureaucracy, because it is not supported by the laity and hardly by its own clerical brethren in the synod. The consequence is that the German Protestant church—with the exception of rare instances in the Rhineland, or Hesse or sections of southern Germany—has been continuously threatened by the danger of a formalism that stifles all activity. The much commented upon contrast between the vitality of church life in much of American Protestantism and the lack of it in much of German Protestantism sharply illustrates this point.

A further danger is that establishment may degenerate into an all but indissoluble relationship with a particular political regime, a condition that would not only affect the integrity of the church but in times of political crisis even jeopardize its very existence. German Protestantism has clearly succumbed to this danger, though to a lesser degree than is exemplified in the extreme cases of Erastianism, such as the Greek Orthodox church of Russia before 1917, the Roman Catholic church of France before 1789, or the Anglican church before the Oxford reform movement. The German Protestant church developed an intimacy of relationship with the second empire, and especially with the Prussian state, which, in actuality though not in theory, all

<sup>2</sup> On the following see especially Kerr D. MacMillan, *Protestantism in Germany* (Princeton 1917), particularly pp. 219 ff., 249 ff.

but amounted to an identification of state and church. The church regarded itself, and was regarded by society, as one of the mainstays of the political establishment, ranking after the army and the bureaucracy as the third strongest pillar of the regime. It was unavoidable not only that the moral integrity of the church came to be obscured and impaired but also that when the second empire collapsed the very existence of German Protestantism was called into question. It is true that German Protestantism managed to survive and to find tolerable relations with the Weimar republic. Yet it could not but be profoundly affected by the disappearance of that political system with which it had been so closely associated. Beneath the surface there commenced, in 1918, a severe crisis in the structure of the church, a crisis which German Protestantism has still been unable to resolve satisfactorily.

The second fact to be noted in a structural analysis of German Protestantism is that while its relation to society is all-inclusive as regards formal membership, as regards actual belongingness it is not. One portion of society stands in a positive relation to the church, in the sense of accepting it as the church in which one believes, the church which is one's unquestioned spiritual home and therefore the church to which one truly, not merely nominally, belongs. The relationship of the other portion of society is either that of estrangement or even, despite formal membership, that of open hostility. If the term "class" is divested of the implications it carries in Marxian sociology and is used in a strictly formal sense, the peculiarity of the relationship between church and society can be summarized in the statement that the German Protestant church, though the established church of the country, is nevertheless a church of class rather than of society entire.

The concrete relationship which obtains between German society and the German Protestant church presents a picture of great complexity. In rough approximation it can be said, how-

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ever,<sup>3</sup> that the social groups having a positive relationship to the church are, first, the remnants of feudalism, represented by the junker class, the army and the bureaucracy; second, the peasantry; and third, the lower middle classes of small trade and industry. They form, as it were, the core of the church people, to which must be added, forming the fringe, large sections of the capitalist middle and upper middle classes, though their relation to the church has tended to become problematical. The social groups having a negative relationship are, first, the intellectual elite, in the broad sense of the academically trained free professions as well as the free intelligentsia; and second, the large masses of industrial labor. This means that German Protestantism has succeeded in holding the allegiance of a large body of society whose moral, political and economic power in German society was very great until the advent of the Weimar republic, and remained considerable until the advent of National Socialism. But German Protestantism failed to keep the allegiance of the intellectually leading class, and it definitely lost its control over that class which, though having the lowest rank in the German hierarchy, occupies a pivotal position in an industrialized society. If it is the distinguishing mark of German Catholicism that it has been capable of keeping all strata of society within the church, it is the distinguishing feature of German Protestantism that it lost its hold over two social groups of fundamental importance, and thus suffered loss of control in the social pyramid in two directions: from above as well as from below.<sup>4</sup>

To account fully for the peculiarity of the relationship between church and society would require a historical-sociological analysis

<sup>3</sup> On the following see scattered remarks in Franz Schnabel, *Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert*, vol. 4 (Freiburg 1937) pp. 414 ff.; Max Scheler, *Christentum und Gesellschaft*, Part I, "Konfessionen" (Leipzig 1924) pp. 140 ff.; Heinrich Frick, *Deutschland in der religiösen Weltlage* (Jena 1936); Wilhelm Scherer and Franz Müller, *Der deutsche Katholizismus im Zeitalter des Kapitalismus* (Augsburg 1932).

<sup>4</sup> It may seem that in this respect the situation of German Protestantism does not differ much from that of American Protestantism. In this as well as in other characteristics, however, there is a fundamental difference between the two, resulting from the fundamentally different social structures of the two countries.

of German society in terms of the basic factors which have shaped it, and with special reference to the part played by German Protestantism. Here it must suffice to remark on the negative aspect of the problem, the question why the two classes of industrial labor and the intellectual elite have turned from, or even against, the Protestant church.

As regards industrial labor, the fundamental reason for its disassociation from and opposition to the church is the existence of a profound schism in the Protestant regions of German society, caused by the self-constitution of industrial labor as a "proletariat" in the original meaning of the word.<sup>5</sup> Labor, though still a part *in* the existing society, no longer considered itself a part *of* it, but rather regarded itself as part of the society to come. In a process of secession it radically rejected the fundamental assumptions upon which the given social structure was established, and tried to erect in their place the moral-intellectual foundations of a world of its own. In this process of negation of the present and affirmation of the future the Protestant church was rejected too, and in point of fact was replaced by the establishment of the counter-church of Marxism. The Protestant church was considered an integral element of the existing society, more specifically, an ideological weapon in the hands of its oligarchical class, the capitalist bourgeoisie.

There were, to be sure, many recurring attempts by German Protestantism to bridge the gap thus opened between the church and the proletariat: from Wichern to Stöcker and Adolph Wagner, from the *Evangelisch-Soziale* to the religious socialists, there was an uninterrupted line of effort to win the masses of industrial labor back to the church. Yet whatever their merits otherwise, in their appointed task these efforts turned out to be failures, largely—as will be discussed presently—because of the general social attitude displayed by German Protestantism as a whole. Where German Catholicism succeeded with similar efforts, Ger-

<sup>5</sup> On the meaning of the term "proletariat" see Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London 1935-39), especially vol. 4.

man Protestantism failed. Industrial labor could not in any appreciable number be brought to return to the Protestant church.

As regards the intellectuals, their alienation from the church can be said to be a general phenomenon, observable not only in Germany and not only in Protestantism. As such it can easily be explained in terms of the increasing tension between Christianity and the secularist temper of the modern world. But in the case of German Protestantism this general reason is combined with special reasons which greatly intensified the process of the alienation of intellectuals from the church. These special reasons derive from the complex of peculiarities—sociological as well as ideological—which characterize the German intellectual elite. Here only two of these peculiarities can be mentioned, and but briefly.

The one is the fact that the German intellectual elite has been allowed to enjoy a freedom of thought, though not of action, which is much greater and more irresponsible than that enjoyed by the corresponding groups in other countries. To put the matter differently, in its *Weltanschauung* the German intellectual elite, to a much lesser degree than is the case in Anglo-Saxon countries, has been subjected to and disciplined by the restraining influence of social traditions, the reason being, of course, the fundamental weakness of German society. Accordingly it has been continuously tempted to display an abstract radicalism of thought, rarely tempered by a sense of social responsibility and bordering on nihilism in the boldness of its essentially destructive unconcern for and criticism of concrete reality. The inevitable consequence of this development has been that the generally negative attitude of the intellectuals toward the church could not but be further strengthened.

The other peculiarity is the fact that with the breakdown of the Hegelian system and its attempt to reconcile philosophy and religion, Christianity largely ceased to be a formative factor in the education of the German intellectual elite. Higher education, and especially university education, still largely classical

in nature, traveled in the direction of actual if not nominal disassociation from Christianity. In German higher education the positive relation of classicism to Christianity, originally meant by the word "classical education" and still maintaining itself to some degree in other countries, turned into one of increasing indifference or antagonism between the two. And to the degree to which higher education became realistic-technical instead of remaining classical, the disassociation became, of course, even more pronounced. Thus in the most formative years of their lives the German intellectual elite came to be less and less influenced, whether positively or negatively, by Christian thought, until there was no longer any influence at all.<sup>6</sup>

Again, what is the significance for German Protestantism of the fact that church and society are related to each other in this particular manner? At first sight the relationship between church and society appears to be expressive of great strength. Not only is the church supported by a numerically large mass of people, but it is supported by those classes which, by virtue of their political power or their economic wealth or their moral prestige, occupy important places and exercise considerable influence in the existing society. In this respect, therefore, German Protestantism, too, appears to be sociologically strong and powerful. On closer inspection, however, the relationship between church and society reveals itself to be of a most precarious nature.

To begin with, it is always problematical for a church to hold the allegiance of only a sector of society and not of society as a whole, however large, powerful and representative the sector may be. And this situation spells definite danger if the society is rent by a fundamental schism and if the church is supported only *this* side of the dividing line.

But in the case of German Protestantism there is a graver

<sup>6</sup> It is true, of course, that German Catholicism as well as German Protestantism has been subject to these particular tendencies. The difference between the two is that Catholicism, because of the strength of its institutional framework and the adaptability of its social attitude, has been largely successful in its efforts to keep these trends from materializing; Protestantism, for the most part, has not.

<sup>7</sup> See the th  
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danger still.<sup>7</sup> German society, there can be no doubt, has for a long time been undergoing a process of radical transformation. Viewed in terms of this process, the relative strength and weakness of the various classes of society do not appear the same as they do when viewed merely in static terms. The classes having a positive relation to the church appear to be, in a large measure, the ones that belong with the past rather than with the future, with the dying rather than with the emerging social order; for the pre-capitalist and a-capitalist strata and the capitalistic bourgeoisie appear fated to suffer decline, possibly dissolution and extinction. On the other hand, the classes having only a negative relation to the church seem to be the ones that belong with the social order to come rather than with the order that is disappearing, for both the intellectual elite and the proletariat, though in totally different ways, seem destined to shape the future, not only in the negative sense of being instruments of destruction of the still existing order, but also in the positive sense of being capable of playing essential roles in the future order. They are potent with future possibilities, whether these possibilities materialize or not. For the church, association with the one group of classes means an identification with a present already turning into a past; and disassociation from the other group means the loss of possible contact with the future. Thus the relationship between church and society, far from being an expression of strength, actually reveals an inherent weakness of German Protestantism.

Turning from the realm of reality to the realm of ideas, the fact to be noted next is that German Protestantism has developed a social-political philosophy, or rather a general attitude toward matters of the secular world, that is distinctly its own. In broad terms this attitude can be described as passivism in form, being opposed to all forms of *direct* social and political action, and

<sup>7</sup> See Paul Tillich, *The Religious Situation in Germany* (New York 1932); also the thoughtful remarks of a conservative Lutheran, Rudolf Smend, *Krise, ein Manifest* (Weimar 1932).

anti-liberal and anti-democratic conservatism in content. There is not to be found in German Protestantism that positive relationship with the principles of democracy and liberalism, based on the notion that they are identical with or easily derived from the Gospels, which is characteristic of much of American Protestantism. Nor can there be detected much of the humanitarian activism of direct social reform, of which the social gospel movement is an instance.<sup>8</sup> On the contrary, there is in general a strong conviction that, from the point of view of the Christian doctrine, liberalism and democracy are to be suspected rather than embraced, and there is an equally strong conviction that social activism must be objected to rather than urged. Against them German Protestantism is inclined to emphasize the principle of authority and the principle of aloofness from social-political matters, believing them to follow from, and to be the true expressions of, the Christian faith.

What are the reasons that have prompted German Protestantism to develop this particular attitude? No attempt to give an adequate answer to this question can be made here. To do so would require a concrete analysis of the total context of forces by which the history of German Protestantism has been determined. Here all that can be done is to indicate, in an abstract and fragmentary fashion, what would appear to be the most general and basic elements of such an analysis.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> This statement must not be misunderstood. German Protestantism, to be sure, is not without social movements outwardly comparable with the American social gospel movement. But the point is that in Germany such movements are exceptions rather than the rule, and are based on theoretical grounds totally different from those of the social gospel and similar movements.

<sup>9</sup> On the following see Ernst Troeltsch, *op. cit.*; Paul Joachimsen, *Die Sozialethik des Luthertums* (Munich 1927); Walter Köhler, *op. cit.*; Werner Elert, *Morphologie des Luthertums*, 2 vols. (Munich 1931-32); Helmuth Kittel, *Religion als Geschichtsmacht* (Leipzig-Berlin 1939); Gerhard Ritter, "Die Ausprägung deutscher und westeuropäischer Geisteswelt im konfessionellen Zeitalter," *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 149 (Munich 1933) pp. 240 ff.; Eduard Heimann, "The Gulf between Germany and the West," *Christendom*, vol. 3 (1940) pp. 322 ff. See also my remarks on Lutheranism in "On the Intellectual Origin of National Socialism," *Social Research*, vol. 9 (May 1942) pp. 225 ff.



Reference must be made first to a fact which is of capital importance in the intellectual history of German Protestantism: the fact that the articulation of its social-political thought has taken place in a "horizon" of theological doctrines about the nature of the "world"—that is, society and the state—which are in marked contrast to those by which the thought of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism has been shaped. These doctrines, which derive from the Lutheran rather than from the Calvinist-Reformed theology, can be briefly summarized in three general statements.

First, since the world represents not the original order of things but the order of things perverted and decayed by sin, it is ruled not by the law of love but by the law of force. This will continue to be so as long as the world exists. According to the doctrine of the redemption of human nature by grace there is a strong possibility for the individual Christian to live according to the law of love, as far as his own inward life and his intimate personal relations are concerned, but as far as the world is concerned this possibility is not open to him. Hence any attempt to establish the kingdom of God, that is, the kingdom of love, by human-social effort is of necessity doomed to failure. The idea of theocracy in this world is utopian, and must not only be rejected but must even be abhorred.

Second, in order that there be some kind of external order in a sinful world, constantly threatened by chaos and anarchy, it is imperative that there be a strong government with definite power to rule. Authority of the ruler is more important than liberty of the ruled. Consequently obedience to the established government must be enjoined, rather than the right to oppose it, even if the government abuse its power and turn into a tyranny. There is but one exception where resistance to the government is permitted and even called for: if the government fails to discharge its duty toward the church, which is the protection of the freedom of the church to preach the Gospel.

Third, the world is of but little significance compared with the infinite significance of the spiritual realm of man's personal

existence. The world is merely the external framework within which the life of man moves, and not its true substance. Its true substance is in the realm of the spirit, over which the world has no power. Hence one must concern oneself with the things of the spirit, rather than with the things of the world: "Christus kümmert sich nicht um die Politie."<sup>10</sup> The primary duty of the church is to preach the gospel of redemption and salvation of the human soul, not to concern itself with the world or try to improve it.

Since German Protestantism articulated its social thought along the lines of this theological interpretation of the nature of the world, and was influenced little if at all by the totally different interpretations offered by Calvinism and the sectarian movements, it is understandable that it tended to be intellectually prefigured toward a social-political attitude favorable to authoritarianism and passivism, and unfavorable to democracy and social activism. The greater efficacy in Germany of the Lutheran than of the Calvinist-Reformed theology must thus be regarded as a factor of primary causal significance in the rise of the particular "ideological" character of German Protestantism.

A second factor in the development of this special character was the particular political conditions prevailing in Germany. They affected the development of German Protestantism in two ways; negatively, by preventing it, especially in its formative period, from coming into actual contact with liberal and democratic movements, with the result that there can be found in Germany no parallel of any importance to the phenomenon, characteristic of both England and America, of Protestant Christian movements and democratic-liberal movements coalescing with each other; positively, by establishing an alliance between "altar and throne," that is, between the Protestant church and the conservative-feudal state, and by keeping the church in the a-political realm of pure "spirituality," where it had little opportunity to engage in great social or political activities of its own. Thus

<sup>10</sup> Luther, in one of his table talks; see especially Walter Köhler, *op. cit.*

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the effect on the church of the German political conditions has been to strengthen and reenforce rather than to counterbalance the underlying intellectual tendencies in German Protestantism; and it is therefore to these political conditions that we must attribute the fact that an intellectual predisposition came to materialize in a definite social-political attitude. The Lutheran churches of the Scandinavian countries succeeded despite their Lutheran presuppositions in finding a positive relation to their countries' principles of democratic liberalism and to the idea of social-political activism, but the German Protestant church, only half Lutheran, failed to do so, because of the combination of "ideological" with "real" factors.

The implications for the general nature of German Protestantism of the fact that it displays this particular social-political attitude can easily be seen. Because of the realism and pessimism which are at the foundation of its social-political thought it has never tended to succumb to an easy optimism and idealism in social-political matters. Since it has always had a sober understanding of the darker forces operating in the "world," and has therefore been singularly free of a belief in the illimitable possibilities of either reason or goodwill in the affairs of state and society, it has shown little inclination toward Pelagianism in general or toward a moralistic humanitarianism or enthusiastic utopianism in particular. On the other side, it is in the very nature of the position held by German Protestantism that it is exposed to another extreme: the possibility that its realism and pessimism turn into the complete a-moralism and cynicism of despair; that it abandon the notion of a moral norm by which the things of the world ought to be judged even if they cannot be changed, and that it thus leave the world entirely to its own fate; and especially that it bring about a complete divorce between politics and morals. This danger was present in German Protestantism from the beginning—even though original Lutheranism had, of course, very definite standards of judgment, and was fully aware, for instance, of the distinction between a just state

and a tyranny—and it largely materialized under the influence of a misunderstood Hegelianism and the subsequent positivism in nineteenth century German thought. Thus the feature that characterizes German as compared with English-American Protestantism is the fact that in the former the reality of a-moralism in the world is made into a theory of a-moralism sanctioning the reality, while the latter, faced with the same reality, maintains the necessity of moral judgment and moral effort, not only in regard to the individual but also in regard to the "world."

The final fact to be observed in the analysis of the general nature of German Protestantism is that in regard to the question of doctrinal foundation—the question of what constitutes the ultimate truth on which the church is founded—German Protestantism, in a greater measure than the Protestantism of other countries, is characterized not only by grave dissension on fundamentals but also by a growing inability to master the question. This peculiarity, it seems to me, is due, first, to the very nature of Protestantism. Though Protestantism is surely compatible with definite doctrines claiming to be objectively true, and in point of fact was established by the Reformers on the basis of such doctrines, it obviously cannot have dogmas in the strict sense of the word, because the church lacks the infallible authority *jure divino* which alone would be capable of fashioning a doctrine into a real dogma. Hence in Protestantism the answer to the question of ultimate truth can never be given with unalterable finality. In the second place, however, the peculiarity is due to the particular nature of the solutions of the doctrinal problem offered by German neo-Protestantism, that is to say, the solutions offered after the supernaturalism of original Protestantism had in large measure broken down. And it is due, finally, to the particular intellectual-moral climate in Germany, as a result of which, regardless of tradition, the various solutions suggested are driven with theoretical radicalism to their ultimate logical conclusions.

In the efforts of German Protestantism to find a solution to the doctrinal problem four broad lines of thought can be discerned. The first is supernaturalism, represented especially by Lutheran Biblicism. There the doctrinal problem is disposed of by the unqualified acceptance of Revelation—of the tenet that the rock on which the Christian church is founded is the objective truth as revealed in the divinely inspired "Word." This line of thought was originally laid down by the Reformers, and it was subsequently articulated in the attempts to formulate a definite body of doctrinal statements such as are contained in the Augsburg Confession or the Formula of Concord. It has always been present in German Protestantism, even if it has been at times merely subterranean, as it were. Pushed into the background in the nineteenth century, it has found a powerful reassertion in the twentieth century, with the emergence of neo-orthodoxy in the theology of Karl Barth and others. On the whole, however, supernaturalism has played a relatively minor role in the period of neo-Protestantism. The other three lines of thought have been the prevailing ones.

The first of these is the line represented by liberal theology in the widest sense of the term, including the theology of rationalism as well as that of neo-Kantianism and historicism. Here the solution of the doctrinal problem is sought in terms of reason or morality or history. In other words, it is believed that the truth of Christianity can be shown to derive from the eternal verities of reason, or from the commands of our moral consciousness, or from the objective meaning of history. The theology of Wolff, the theology of Hermann, the theology of Harnack and Troeltsch may be cited as outstanding illustrations of these respective positions.

The second is the line of thought represented by the theology of pietism and romanticism. Here the attempt is made to solve the doctrinal problem in terms of emotion rather than of reason. Religion is conceived of as primarily an affair of the human heart, and hence it is argued that the truth of Christianity cannot be

demonstrated by metaphysics or ethics or the philosophy of history, but must be demonstrated with reference to the inner experience, the "inner light" of awakened persons.

The third is the line of thought represented, on the one hand, by the mission theology of Wichern, on the other by a theology which derives its main impulses from Kierkegaardian existentialism. Here the answer to the doctrinal problem is given in terms of *die Tat*. Neither reason nor emotion is believed capable of furnishing the real basis on which the truth of Christianity can be established. The truth of Christianity can be found only in the evidence of life: in the exemplary conduct of the individual Christian, or in the exercise of love and charity.

With the question whether these characteristic attempts by modern German Protestantism to find a solution to the doctrinal problem are consistent with the original presuppositions of Protestantism, I am not here concerned. Nor am I concerned with the question whether they are theoretically capable of achieving the intended goal. The point to be made here is that although they contributed greatly to the richness of thought in German Protestant theology, they turned out to be more or less failures in reaching what they set out to achieve.<sup>11</sup> Instead of proving the truth of Christianity they even tended, objectively, to disprove it. The reason for this resides in the ambiguity of their points of departure, which could lead into any of several opposite directions, and in the fact that German Protestant theology was largely unable to resolve this ambiguity or at least to push it resolutely aside. To give but one example, the attempts of the theology of pietism and romanticism to demonstrate the truth of Christianity developed in a direction which ultimately led to the national German religion of Lagarde and his followers, the reason being that emotions, essentially empty of content, are

<sup>11</sup> See Karl Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche* (Zurich-New York 1941) pp. 148 ff., 509 ff., 514 ff.; Wilhelm Lütgert, *Die Religion des Idealismus und ihr Ende*, Part 4, "Das Ende des deutschen Idealismus im Zeitalter Bismarcks" (Gütersloh 1930); Erik Peterson, "Briefwechsel mit Adolf Harnack und ein Epilog," *Hochland*, vol. 30 (Munich 1932-33) pp. 111 ff.

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equally capable of being filled with a Christian content or of deteriorating into a mere vague and irresponsible feeling of private or national religiosity.

Thus German Protestantism is characterized by the lack of a firm doctrinal foundation. It has been said—disapprovingly by Catholic, approvingly by Protestant writers<sup>12</sup>—that this characteristic is in the very nature of Protestantism. Whether or not this is true is a question not to be discussed here. What must be emphasized is that the lack of doctrinal foundation clearly implied for German Protestantism the peril of disintegration from an objective reality as a church into the mere ideality of a floating opinion.

In conclusion, German Protestantism presents the picture of a church strong in many ways but weak in foundation. It presents the picture of a church in a state of latent but unremitting crisis. The extent and intensity of the crisis may be open to dispute, but the fact itself cannot be denied. And the question is, then, would German Protestantism, if faced with a fundamental challenge, be able to resolve the crisis, or would the crisis be allowed to run its inevitable course?

## II

It is against this background of facts and problems that one must set the events of the latest, the National Socialist, phase in the history of German Protestantism, for only thus is one able to gain the right perspective for analysis of their nature and meaning. National Socialism, there can be no doubt, constituted the greatest challenge flung at the Christian churches of Germany, both Catholic and Protestant, since the threat of the Turks. How would German Protestantism react to it? From what has been said it might be conjectured that German Protestantism, ill equipped to offer resistance, would be an easy prey to National Socialism. In view of its social-political attitude and its doctrinal

<sup>12</sup> Examples are, on the Catholic side, Bossuet, and on the Protestant side, Friedrich Theodor Vischer. See Schnabel, *op. cit.*, pp. 525 ff.

weakness on the one hand, and, on the other, its association with the state and its positive relation to the classes from which National Socialism originally drew its heaviest support, it might even seem likely that German Protestantism would be favorably disposed toward the new movement.

And, indeed, when National Socialism established itself in power it was greeted with highest hopes and with expressions of greatest confidence by a large majority of the leaders of German Protestantism, theologians and church officials alike. The "national revolution" was pronounced the rebirth of the German people, for which both the nation and the church ought to be grateful.

It is therefore but logical that the *first* distinct reaction of German Protestantism to the challenge of National Socialism was an attempt at reconciliation rather than at opposition. A new church party, called the German Christians, formed itself with the avowed purpose of carrying out this attempt.<sup>13</sup> Its aim was twofold: to demonstrate theoretically the fundamental compatibility of Christianity and National Socialism; and to reshape in practice the whole life of the church in the light of this principle. The first aim it achieved by the development of a theology which, in a bold reinterpretation, curiously blended elements of the pietistic and the historicistic liberal theology, and which had as its central principle the notion of a special revelation to the German people proclaiming a special affinity between Protestant Christianity, Germanism and National Socialism. The second aim led to a radical program of reform of the church. This included the reorganization of the church along the authoritarian and totalitarian lines of National Socialism, in particular the appointment of a "leader" in the church too, here to be called a "Reichsbischof"; the introduction of measures by which "non-Aryans," Christians of Jewish blood, could be excluded from

<sup>13</sup> The best account of the German Christians is given in Erik Peterson, "Die neueste Entwicklung der protestantischen Kirche in Deutschland," *Hochland*, vol. 31 (Munich 1933-34) pp. 64 ff., 144 ff.; see also Emanuel Hirsch, *Das kirchliche Wollen der deutschen Christen* (Berlin 1933).

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the church or at least made into church members of a lower rank; a radical reformulation of the basic creeds of the church in the spirit of the new theology, in particular a repudiation of the Old Testament as an integral part of the Christian faith and a reinterpretation of the New Testament in the new *völkisch* terms. Directed by a militant leadership and strongly supported, from within, by a large body of National Socialists in the church membership and, from without, by the political power, the German Christians were highly successful at first. By the end of 1933 the actual power in the church was almost completely in their hands. What opposition there was appeared weak and unorganized. Complete victory seemed assured.

It was not to materialize, however, for in the meantime there had emerged within the church an opposition movement that was to have far-reaching consequences in the history of German Protestantism. Led by the theologian Karl Barth, on the one hand, and by the clergyman Martin Niemöller, on the other, it soon developed from small beginnings into the strong current of what has come to be known as the movement of "the confessing church."<sup>14</sup> Representatives of the neo-orthodox theology formed its nucleus, and its membership also included representatives of the old Lutheran orthodoxy and of the old church bureaucracy, especially that of the Prussian churches. The movement was supported by a numerically rather weak body of laymen drawn from all social strata of the church, although at first the politically conservative groups prevailed. It must be clearly understood that the movement was formed by, and was representative of, the theologically orthodox elements within the church: it was not formed by, nor was it representative of, the liberal elements.

It was the emergence of this movement that constituted the second and unexpected reaction of German Protestantism to the challenge of National Socialism. The nature of this reaction can

<sup>14</sup> This translation of the term *Bekennniskirche* (or *Bekennende Kirche*, which is also used) is offered in place of the usual translation, "confessional church," which seems to me incorrect.

be seen from a brief analysis of the ensuing so-called "church struggle" in so far as it applied to Protestantism.<sup>15</sup>

The church struggle has been interpreted mainly in terms of a political conflict between a part of the Protestant church and National Socialism. It is therefore necessary to point out that originally it was strictly an internal church affair—a struggle of the confessing church against the German Christians, and not a struggle against National Socialism as such. Its concern was with religious, not political, matters, the belief being that the two not only can be, but must be, kept separate from one another. The chief issue was the new theology of the German Christians, which the confessing church considered a heresy to be utterly rejected. In other words, the church struggle was a struggle on the part of the confessing church against what it regarded as the adulteration of the Christian faith by the German Christians. In concrete terms, it was a struggle against the interpretation of the Gospel in *völkisch* terms, against the introduction into the church of a division between Aryan and non-Aryan Christians, and against the attempt to "coordinate" the church with the new political system. There was no opposition to National Socialism as such; in point of fact, among the leaders of the confessing church there were a number of persons who considered themselves politically National Socialists, though, in fairness, it must be added that they hardly realized what National Socialism really was.

The very logic of the situation made it inevitable, however, that the struggle which commenced within the church would soon

<sup>15</sup> Of the literature on the church struggle the following may be mentioned: Karl Barth, *Theologische Existenz heute* (Munich 1933), *Trouble and Promise in the Struggle of the Church in Germany* (London 1938), and "The Protestant Churches in Europe," *Foreign Affairs* (January 1944) pp. 260 ff.; Paul B. Means, *Things that are Caesar's* (New York 1935); Arthur S. Duncan-Jones, *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany* (London 1938); Michael Powers, *Religion in the Third Reich* (New York 1939); Hugh Martin, Douglas Newton, M. Waddams, and R. R. Williams, *Christian Counter-Attack* (New York 1944); Adolf Frey, *Cross and Swastika* (London 1938); *Church Struggle in Germany, A Survey of Four Crucial Years by an English Christian*, with a preface by E. S. Woods (London 1937).

surpass the boundaries of the church and issue in a struggle between the confessing church and National Socialism itself. The reason why this development was bound to occur was not merely that the German Christians claimed to represent National Socialism within the Protestant church, and not merely that the National Socialist state openly interfered in the church struggle on the side of the German Christians; there was also the profounder reason that as the struggle developed, and as the nature of National Socialism could no longer be explained away as the inevitable excesses accompanying all revolutionary movements, the recognition was forced upon the confessing church that its interpretation of the Christian faith was radically incompatible not only with the principles of the German Christians but with the very principles on which National Socialism itself was founded. From this moment on, the fundamental issue was no longer merely the heresy of the German Christians but the nature of National Socialism, as manifested in its two essential features: totalitarianism, with its complete disregard for the sanctity of individual life and its flouting of the most elementary notions of justice; and its claim to be a new religion of salvation based on the doctrine of a kind of second revelation through Hitler and a second justification through the blood community of the chosen German people.<sup>16</sup> Thus the struggle turned from one between two church parties into one between the Christian faith and National Socialism, in so far as the latter represented not merely a political system but a total *Weltanschauung*.<sup>17</sup>

It is not necessary to recount here the facts of the actual struggle.

<sup>16</sup> See the interesting analysis of this point in Hans Ehrenberg, *The Autobiography of a German Pastor* (London 1943).

<sup>17</sup> From the many pronouncements of the leaders of the confessing church I should like to quote one that is evidence of this broadening of the church struggle. It is taken from a memorandum addressed to Hitler by the confessing church at Whitsuntide 1936: "When blood, race, nationality, and honor are regarded as eternal values the first commandment obliges the Christian to refuse this valuation. When the Aryan is glorified the Word of God teaches that all men are sinful. If the Christian is forced by the Anti-semitism of the Nazi *Weltanschauung* to hate the Jews, he is, on the contrary, bidden by the Christian commandments to love his neighbor." See Martin, et al., *op. cit.*, p. 35.

Two points must be made, however, in order that the historical meaning of the church struggle may be seen in its true proportions and neither be inflated with an extraordinary political significance which it does not have nor be dismissed as wholly negligible.

The first concerns the grave shortcomings of the church struggle. The confessing church labored under inner as well as outer difficulties, which it was incapable of overcoming satisfactorily. The inner difficulties sprang from the Lutheran heritage in political and social thinking, with its emphasis on unqualified obedience to the powers that be, and from the intense patriotism and nationalism, especially in times of war, which have characterized German Protestantism throughout its history. It was these inner difficulties which prevented the confessing church from carrying out a radical *political* opposition to National Socialism; as regards the foreign policy of the regime, for example, the memorable courage of the confessing church during the Munich crisis was the exception rather than the rule, and as regards the persecution of the Jews, its opposition was less than total, absolute and uncompromising. The inner difficulties thus made for a fight on too narrow a front. The outer difficulties derived from the fact that the confessing church failed to win control over the whole Protestant church. It was incapable of routing the German Christians, and though it established a somewhat uneasy alliance with those who tried to steer a middle course in the church struggle, it failed to win them over altogether. Moreover, while it was rather strongly represented among the clergy, it did not have an equally strong following among the masses of the laity. Thus throughout the years of the struggle it remained an intellectually and morally strong but numerically weak elite within the church.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> To give an impression of the relative strength of the confessing church I may mention that according to figures available for Berlin, 160 out of 400 ministers belonged in 1937 to the confessing church, 40 to the German Christians, and 200 were "neutral." These figures appear to be fairly representative of the whole church, though there is no way of being certain. To my knowledge no figures are available on the lay membership, but they would undoubtedly be less favorable for the confessing church than are these figures on the clergy.

But on the other hand—and this is the second point that must be strongly made—despite all its deficiencies the struggle of the confessing church sustained itself over all the years as the only overt opposition—except the parallel struggle of the Catholic church—which National Socialism, for all the power it could command, was unable to destroy. For this reason it acquired a symbolical significance which far outruns its actual achievements. It was only in the struggle of the churches, both Protestant and Catholic—and in a sense particularly in the struggle of the weak confessing church—that there developed a radical spiritual opposition to National Socialism, conducted by men holding firm convictions which they were ready to stand by whatever the consequences, and demonstrating a toughness of constitution which even one of history's most powerful and ruthless political systems could not break. It is justifiable to call this struggle one of the most positive phenomena in the darkest era of German history.

What significance did the struggle of the confessing church have for German Protestantism itself? There can be hardly a doubt that but for this struggle the Protestant church would have faced extinction. Nor can there be a doubt that the struggle gave the whole Protestant church a new strength and vitality, despite, perhaps even because of, the internal strife between the two church parties, and gave to the part represented by the confessing church a new sense of unity born of suffering and of having been a witness for the Christian faith. Finally, as regards the place held by German Protestantism within the nation, there can be no doubt that, by the action of the confessing church in radically daring to fight Hitler, the Protestant church, despite the amazing spectacle of the emergence of a church group such as the German Christians, acquired a moral prestige far greater than it had possessed for a long time.

It would be illusory, however, to suppose that the church struggle meant the solution of that profound crisis in German Protestantism which I have been endeavoring to outline. To be sure, the problems that constitute that crisis were at the very

foundation of the struggle, and hence could not but be keenly felt and even clearly realized by the confessing church. But answered they were not. The church struggle of itself did not bring an answer to the problems arising from the particular relationship between German Protestantism and state and society, though there was not lacking a keen awareness of the inadequacy of the existing arrangement and the necessity for a new solution. Nor did the church struggle of itself bring an answer to the problems presented by the particular nature of political and social thought in German Protestantism, despite a growing understanding of them and earnest attempts to overcome the most outstanding deficiencies of the old ways of thought and to grope for new ones.<sup>19</sup> And as regards the doctrinal problem, the confessing church had a firm doctrinal basis, but the church struggle was of itself incapable of bringing nearer a solution of this problem for the Protestant church as a whole. Thus the meaning of the church struggle for German Protestantism would appear to be, not that the crisis of the latter was solved but that it was brought into the open. The solution was still left to the future.

### III

What can be said about the future of German Protestantism? One can safely assume that the old world in which German Protestantism lived and moved and had its being is gone. Gone beyond recall is the state, the society, the very civilization to which it belonged, from the materials of which it had formed itself, and of which it was itself an integral and essential part. A thirty-year crisis of unsurpassed dimensions, culminating in the final catastrophe of National Socialism, has done away with them. Gone also, it would appear, is German Protestantism itself, in the shape in which we have come to know it. Has it gone altogether? Or will it survive in a new form? In other words, is the relationship of Protestantism in general, and German Protestantism in

<sup>19</sup> The most interesting attempt was made by Karl Barth, "in *The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day* (New York 1939).



particular, with a particular historical world that is about to disappear in Germany an essential relationship or, ultimately, a merely accidental one? Is German Protestantism indissolubly linked to that world, being, as has been asserted, its ideological expression and nothing more? Or will it be capable of disassociating itself from that world, and thus outlive the disintegration of the latter? And if so, is it likely to be strong enough to reestablish itself, in whatever form, in the emerging world of the future?

The student of German Protestantism cannot help concerning himself with these questions, though it is perfectly obvious that no answer can be given which can claim any degree of finality. Only in speculation can an answer even be approximated. It is with considerable hesitation that I venture to tread on that slippery ground, and to try, in a few brief, general and abstract remarks, to scan the horizon of future possibilities.

There are those who believe that German Protestantism, perhaps after a period of languishing, neither living nor dying, will in the mass of its membership return to where it started from, the Catholic mother church, and that so far as it then still maintains an independent existence of its own, it will live on merely in the small circles of a few. In this view it will then no longer exist as a church, but only in two sociological forms: spiritual mysticism and sectarianism. As justification for the prediction of such a development it is contended that Catholicism will exercise great power and influence, spiritual and political, in the moral and political vacuum of post-fascist Europe; that Protestantism in general, and German Protestantism in particular, is internally and externally weak; and that the world to come will take a collectivist shape which will leave no room for a true Protestantism.

While not denying the distinct possibility of such a course of events, I should like to oppose to it the equally distinct possibility of an opposite trend. If German Protestantism survives at all, it will do so, it seems to me, only as a distinct entity, in other words, as an organized body or as a church of its own, though

one, to be sure, which will again recognize its essential though necessarily dialectic relationship to the Catholic church. My belief in this possibility is based on a general and on a special reason. The general reason is the fact that German Protestantism has been embedded so strongly in the life of the country that it is still, despite all its weakness, one of the most important and most undisputed factors of tradition. And the strength of a tradition in religious matters must never be underestimated. The special reason is the unexpected strength that German Protestantism exhibited during the period of National Socialism, and the moral capital which, as much as German Catholicism, it accumulated by virtue of this strength. German Protestantism, it may be recalled, survived the first Thirty Years war to flourish afterward. It is possible that it may survive the second Thirty Years war too, and enter into a new and strong phase of its history.

It is impossible to go beyond these abstract and general remarks and discuss the question of the new forms and structures that may emerge. It is possible, however, and even necessary to remark here on the *negative conditions* that must be fulfilled if this second possibility is to materialize at all. The first of the negative conditions is that German Protestantism slough off its relationship with the state and bring about a radical separation of state and church. Only then could the church again become truly free, morally and intellectually—in Jakob Burckhardt's words, "Element und Beleg der geistigen Freiheit."<sup>20</sup> The second condition is that German Protestantism overcome its fateful class character and become again the church of the whole people, whatever the social order of the future may be. Only then could it again be possessed of a moral prestige sufficient to render it a strong power in society. And the final condition is that German Protestantism resolutely turn its back upon the doctrinal vagaries of the era of liberal theology and find again a firm doctrinal foundation. Only then would it have the power to proclaim a message commensurate with the desperate condition of man.

<sup>20</sup> Jakob Burckhardt, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 7 (Stuttgart 1929) p. 91.



## IV

What possible role can German Protestantism be expected to play in the immediate post-Nazi world of the Germany of tomorrow? If it is true that the final goal to be achieved is Germany's eventual return to the community of civilized nations, what is the outstanding problem to be faced in bringing this about? Had not the sluggishness of our thinking kept us from seeing things as they are, it would have been clear from the beginning, and would not have needed the confirmation of recent months, that the real problem is not Nazism—let alone Prussian militarism—but its aftermath: the complete spiritual, moral and intellectual vacuum that Germany is today. The real problem is the breakdown of all certainties—the old and the new—and the consequent weariness, desperation and panic of the soul. The real problem is not the peril of Nazism, it is the complete loss of moral-intellectual orientation, bordering on total spiritual anarchy.

It follows that what is demanded by the objective requirements of the situation is means and methods which, negatively, will act as a breakwater against the threatening chaos and, positively, will be capable of reestablishing the foundations of civilized life in the elementary sense of simple decency, respect for the dignity of the human person, recognition of justice and freedom as the essential principles of social order. Unless one entertain the wholly utopian notion that our age is capable of creative civilized effort *ex nihilo*, these means and methods, in the ultimate analysis, can be provided only by the wholehearted reassertion of that tradition on which the civilization of the occidental world is founded: the classical Christian faith and the Greek-Roman legacy. After the breakdown in Germany of *all* secular religions—including socialism and communism—there are no other sources to draw upon.

For this reason German Protestantism may justifiably be considered of great potential significance to the effort of rebuilding civilized life in Germany. There is no doubt, for one thing, that it still incorporates, in however diluted and even perverted a form, part of the classical Christian faith. And with its funda-

mental beliefs and its practical virtues it still represents a great treasure in German life, not easily to be dispensed with in times of catastrophe. For another thing, it still holds the allegiance of, and exercises a considerable influence over, large masses of people, an allegiance and an influence that are bound to deepen as the misery of life increases. And, finally, it must be remembered that German Protestantism, in however small a measure, is still expressive in German life of a heritage that is not merely German but common to the occidental world.

If German Protestantism thus appears to be a potentially strong and important factor in the reconquest of civilization in Germany, it is immediately necessary to point out that the statement of a potentiality is one thing and its materialization quite another. Whether German Protestantism will actually play the role that is here potentially assigned to it cannot be answered in advance. This depends on a number of conditions, above all, on whether it will be capable of solving its own crisis, and on whether the total crisis will get out of bounds altogether. Therein lies the challenge to German Protestantism. Whether it will be responded to, remains to be seen.

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# INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE CURRICULUM

BY PHILLIPS BRADLEY

## I

NO ONE who contemplates the potentialities of postwar industrial relations in the United States for the advancement or the destruction of democracy is unaware of their profound significance for our way of life. The underlying tensions in these relations have been tightened by our experiences during the Great Depression and the recent war. Although we have developed many governmental agencies and a number of unofficial institutions for the purpose of harmonizing industrial relations and bridging the cleavages within our industrial society, we have not removed the psychological, economic and social differences which the "industrial discipline" has intensified.<sup>1</sup>

There are numerous indications that the shift in the balance of power between labor and management during the past two decades has created widespread concern among many groups. This concern is reflected, in part, by such governmental regulations as the Smith-Connally Act,<sup>2</sup> various state regulatory acts,<sup>3</sup> and the proposed Hatch-Burton-Ball bill for a system of partial compulsory arbitration of labor disputes.<sup>4</sup> These are straws in a wind that is blowing from a very different direction from that of even ten years ago. More than one unofficial organization, moreover, is openly or covertly hostile to labor's aims and hopes.

<sup>1</sup> See, for instance, A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 2 (New York 1945) pp. 158, 177 ff.

<sup>2</sup> War Labor Disputes Act, 78th Congress, Sec. I, 57; Stat. 163, Title 50, Ch. 144, June 6, 1943 (U. S. Code 1940 ed., suppl. III, 1941-43).

<sup>3</sup> See New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Industrial and Labor Conditions, *Report* (Leg. Doc., 1945, No. 39) pp. 42-48.

<sup>4</sup> Federal Industrial Relations Bill, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., S. 1171.

This shift in the balance of power has, however, produced other drifts of thought in official quarters and among many important organizations of both employers and workers. A recent, and a most encouraging, indication of a growing desire to develop more cooperative industrial relations is the joint statement of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the Committee for Economic Development, the American Federation of Labor, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.<sup>5</sup> Another hopeful sign is the broadening interest in cooperative educational activities: some sponsored by state governments and state universities; others, by private educational institutions; still others, by industrial groups and labor organizations.<sup>6</sup>

One reason for this growing interest in, and experimentation with, education as a potential aid to making industrial relations more cooperative derives, in part, from an awareness that, with the acquisition of power in a democratic society, there runs a correlative responsibility for its use in the public interest. As labor unions have become more powerful, the desirability of education as a tool for using their power more effectively and as an instrument for clarifying their responsibilities has become obvious. On the side of management this potential of education

<sup>5</sup> *New York Times*, March 29, 1945, p. 16.

<sup>6</sup> For a partial survey of educational activities see Board of Temporary Trustees of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, *Report* (Leg. Doc., 1945, No. 20) pp. 63 ff. The establishment of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University in 1944 (L. 1944, Ch. 162, and L. 1945, Ch. 259) is one indication of state governments' increasing attention to education as a factor in industrial relations. An act of the California Legislature (A. B. 391, L. 1945, Ch. 1416) provides an appropriation of \$100,000 for the biennium for similar schools in the University of California at Berkeley and Los Angeles. Several state legislatures have recently enacted increased appropriations for adult education and extension work, in some cases (for example, Michigan 1944) specifically for training in industrial relations and for workers' education.

A number of more important activities undertaken by private institutions are not included in the survey noted above. Among these should be mentioned the industrial relations sections and similar agencies at several important universities. The first of these sections to be established was at Princeton University in 1922. Others in the United States are at the California Institute of Technology and the University of Michigan. These sections carry on a variety of research and instructional activities, in some cases reaching both labor and management groups.

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has already been partially demonstrated through schools of business and similar institutions.

It may be useful, therefore, to review what contributions existing educational institutions in this country can make to both labor and management. How can they aid more keenly and more sensitively in equipping industry and labor to use their power more cooperatively, and to recognize their joint responsibilities—to each other and to the wider community?

The influence that education in industrial relations can exert in bringing about a common understanding of the inherent unity of a democratic industrial society has been well expressed by the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Industrial and Labor Conditions, in its proposal for a specialized school in this field: "One of the most important ways of improving industrial and labor relations is to bring together in a common training program representatives of both labor and industry. What is important here is not merely attendance at the same institution or in the same school, but rather mutual cooperative analysis of the problems common to both groups. These representatives of industry and labor will . . . meet around the council table as negotiators for their respective interests, often as spokesmen for alternative points of view or policies. If they have become acquainted with one another through a common training program, that—in itself—would be a valuable step toward mutual understanding and appreciation of differing attitudes. Understanding and good will are engendered by the sharing of a common background of experience. A common background is one very specific contribution which education could make to the future stability of industrial and labor relations . . ."<sup>7</sup>

This conception offers a useful basis for analysis of the problem in terms of the three types of existing institutions which can contribute to a broad, overall program of education in industrial relations: the high school and academy; the college and university;

<sup>7</sup> New York State Joint Legislative Committee . . ., *Report* (Leg. Doc., 1943, No. 39) p. 56.

and unofficial agencies, whether or not specifically educational in organization and purpose. Each of these types of educational institution has a different, though often overlapping, clientele; each can perform a variety of services; each can be developed further in this area of training than it has yet advanced.

## II

Considering first the role of the high school in developing more cooperative industrial relations, it is obvious that its potential contribution is of great significance. The public high school—and its counterpart, the private academy—today reaches into almost every home in the country. A large proportion of future employers and workers pass through its portals before entering industry. In most communities the high school is the only educational institution available to the entire population, and it is unquestionably the most inclusive educational institution that we have developed in the United States for those continuing their schooling beyond the elementary level.

The high school is, moreover, the most significant educational agency we have for training in citizenship. Even if its services do not reach beyond its immediate clientele—the students—the high school is the last stage of formal education in which about six out of seven of our future citizens participate. If it reaches out to the community at large through forums, classes and discussion groups, it can become a dynamic force in promoting community understanding, and thus more effective citizenship. How then can the high school increase its contribution to more harmonious industrial relations in the postwar period?

Its immediate task is, of course, to teach those who attend it. A review of the development over the past quarter-century of high-school courses and texts in American history and the social studies reveals a significant increase in the attention given to industrial relations throughout the country. It is unnecessary here to analyze this development in detail. Many of those acquainted with the advances made are convinced, however, that

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there is still further opportunity to promote at the high-school level both a broader understanding and a greater awareness of the economic, social and psychological factors in industrial relations.

Without attempting to outline a model curriculum, we may make two or three observations on the present status of industrial relations in our high-school programs. For example, labor's contribution to American democracy receives, on the whole, inadequate attention in American history textbooks. There are, of course, outstanding exceptions to this generalization. Some of the more recent texts do, in fact, provide substantial and unbiased material on labor's role in American life, and it is not unlikely that, with the change in status and the growth of power of labor in this country, future textbooks of American history will give fuller attention to the organization and objectives of the labor movement.

A similar trend is discernible in recent texts on the social studies and on "problems of democracy." Here, too, there is still a significant lack of an informed and impartial treatment of labor's role in our industrial society. Many high schools have utilized so-called "texts" supplied by special-interest groups, most of which, until very recently, have been heavily weighted in favor of management. But even among the reputable textbooks, there are at present few that discuss adequately or objectively labor's contributions to American life and thought, as well as to our industrial progress.<sup>8</sup>

A separate course in industrial relations at the high-school level

<sup>8</sup>One reason for this lack is perhaps the current fashion of including a great variety of topics within a single text. It is at least a debatable question whether, if a study of "problems of democracy" at the high-school level is considered to be one of the most effective ways of training for citizenship, it would not be advisable to reduce the number of topics covered in a year and concentrate more thoroughly on a smaller list of the central problems which our democracy faces. Would not, for instance, a study of from four to six major problems be a more effective method of training for citizenship than a more scattered and diffused consideration of a dozen or more topics? No matter how small the list chosen, it would certainly include industrial relations as one of the two or three basic domestic issues confronting us today and tomorrow.

(perhaps in the eleventh or twelfth years) is still the exception rather than the rule. At present there are not many materials available for establishing such a course, nor are its content and length generally agreed upon.<sup>9</sup> It is probable, however, that with the increasing emphasis on the role of labor in American life we shall see not only the production of more numerous and more varied texts for such a course, but also the introduction of formal courses, half a term or more in length, on different aspects of industrial relations. This trend will be all the more likely to develop if educational practice in this country tends toward concentration rather than diffusion in the social studies.

Another useful contribution that the high school can make is to promote more direct contacts between the classroom and the leaders of labor and management. Our larger towns and smaller cities, as well as the great metropolitan areas, generally include some organized business, commerce and industry, and usually also some organized labor groups. It is almost always possible to find representatives of both employers and workers who are able and willing to interpret the policies and objectives of industry and labor in the classroom or in "activities clubs" in the school. These spokesmen may be invited, too, to participate in forums and panel discussions on various aspects of industrial relations. Also, managers of industrial plants are generally glad to permit observation trips and perhaps discussion with management representatives. With some initiative on the part of the high-school staff, direct contacts with organized labor groups can similarly be established. Such first-hand contacts are particularly valuable in promoting an adequate understanding of what technology means in our society and how it has transformed working conditions.

Finally, it is possible with a little imagination to develop a broad range of library and discussion activities which will supple-

<sup>9</sup> Several texts are available and are being used in a number of schools. See New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Industrial and Labor Conditions, *The American Story of Industrial and Labor Relations* (Albany 1944); H. U. Faulkner and M. Starr, *Labor in America* (New York 1944).

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ment the more formal classroom work.<sup>10</sup> These, too, are an effective means of making the problems of industrial relations "come alive" for the student.

In addition to its immediate services to its students, the high school can also contribute to community understanding of industrial relations. It can become a genuine community center for adult education, organizing its programs of forums, discussion groups and lectures by representatives of labor and management to include not only its own students but the adult public as well.

The high school can also serve as a unique bridge between city and country, between urban and rural attitudes. With the increasing decentralization of industry and the growing trend toward suburban, even rural, residence by city workers, greater mutual understanding of what have too often been conflicting urban-rural viewpoints on economic and social issues becomes all the more important to the stability of our postwar economy. The rural high school, no less than the urban, faces both a challenge and an opportunity to promote this understanding and to facilitate broader urban-rural cooperation by furnishing a center for instruction and discussion.

To make such a program of high-school training in industrial relations effective, it is, of course, essential to equip teachers with a more adequate background in this field. For present high-school staffs more direct contact with industry and with labor would be advantageous. Our teachers' colleges and universities can contribute to making these contacts both possible and fruitful. Labor and management organizations can also facilitate such contacts through cooperative relationships with university summer schools and with local high-school teacher groups, especially in our larger cities.<sup>11</sup> As to our future teachers, it would be useful

<sup>10</sup> See *American Story of Industrial and Labor Relations* (cited above) pp. 298 ff., for some suggested activities of this type.

<sup>11</sup> The University of Michigan, together with several other state universities, is already providing a short summer-internship course in cooperation with local industries in the Detroit area. This type of labor-management-university cooperation is certain to be of great value.

to expand the courses in the field of industrial relations now offered by teachers' colleges. For all prospective high-school teachers, at least one course in the history of the American economy and in industrial relations should be included in their professional training; more than one course should be required of future social-studies teachers. The development of such courses can be materially aided by cooperation between teachers' colleges and universities and organized industrial and labor groups.

Thus it is clear that the educational potential of the high school in improving industrial relations is high. By providing its students with a common background of knowledge and understanding of the working of our economy and of the conduct of these relations, the high school can equip the nation's future employers and workers to embark on their careers with a greater awareness of their fundamental identity of interest in a democratic society. They can be trained to share effectively both the opportunities and the responsibilities of promoting a more stable economic order in the postwar period. And by reaching out to the community through a broad program of adult education in industrial relations, the high school can contribute to the present as well as the future stability of industrial relations. In its dual capacity, as the final stage in the formal training of most of the nation's youth and as the most widespread public agency for informal adult education, the high school has a potential role that is as challenging as it is significant.

### III

The college and the graduate school have no less to offer, although in different ways. From our colleges and universities will be drawn in large part the future professional and technical leaders of both labor and management. Actually, over the past quarter-century or so, our business schools have been training those who are found today in increasing numbers in important management positions, and, in the future, specialized training at the college and university level will provide such leadership for labor too.

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The handling of industrial relations is inevitably becoming a more important function of management, in line with a natural evolution of the past seventy-five years. Our earliest industrial pioneers were skilled primarily in construction—too often, perhaps, at the expense of human or social considerations. They were succeeded by a generation of business leaders whose main talents lay in the field of fiscal management. More recently, competence in the sphere of industrial relations has become a major asset for business leaders, and this skill is likely to be even more important in the immediate future.<sup>12</sup>

A comparable evolution is no less evident in the leadership of the labor movement. The pioneers of the American labor movement were nurtured in what Overstreet calls "the fight image"—an almost inevitable function of their task of organizing the predominantly immigrant workers of the period after the Civil War. They were schooled in the rough-and-tumble of the industrial struggle at its most embittered period. As governmental regulation of industrial relations expanded the role of collective bargaining, labor leaders had to add to their equipment a skill in negotiation and advocacy. More recently still, the labor movement has found it expedient to draft and train technical and professional experts to interpret and develop the economic, social and political factors which affect labor no less than management.

If these observations on the evolution of the requisite leadership skills in our economy are correct, there will be an increasing demand for trained personnel on the part of both labor and management. Experience gained in our accelerated production program during the war period demonstrated that such training needs to be carried much further down the hierarchy of control than in the past. On both sides trained personnel will be needed at many levels below top leadership.

But if the colleges and universities are to provide the most effective training for management and labor leaders of the future,

<sup>12</sup> See Robert A. Gordon, *Business Leadership in the Large Corporation*, Brookings Institution (Washington 1945).

they must revise their present curricula, both general and specialized, and turn out statesmen as well as technicians in industrial relations.

In the first place, a considerably more effective pre-entry training program for undergraduates who look forward to a professional career in industrial relations should be developed. Such a program may be organized in a separate school, as in New York State, but it would not be difficult to work out a pre-professional course within the framework of many existing curricula. The scope and content of such a program may well be flexible. The curriculum of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University, the first to be organized, includes four types of courses: the technical core; the technical background; the general background; the accessory techniques.<sup>13</sup> But whatever curriculum is established for pre-professional training, the need for integration is obvious. A substantial place should be given to field work or internship in both labor and management organizations, in order that students may gain practical experience: personnel offices in management and union halls in the labor movement should be known in actual operation as well as in books.

If the leadership requirements of labor and management are to be filled successfully for the long as well as the short run, pre-entry training should include not only a greater body of professional and technical information and experience, but also a broad cultural background. It is important that those who will ultimately become responsible for top leadership and control, in industrial plants and labor organizations, should be more than efficient technicians. The fundamental difference in outlook between the American and British views of civil service pre-entry training offers an analogy. On the whole, until recently, emphasis in the United States has been upon the acquisition of specialized vocational competence in pre-entry training for civil service careers. The British tendency, if not exactly the contrary, has

<sup>13</sup> Board of Temporary Trustees . . . , *Report*, 1945 (cited above) pp. 22 ff.

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been to emphasize the value of a general cultural education in the choice of personnel for the higher civil service. If, as has been suggested here, the conduct of industrial relations will very largely determine the stability of our economy in the future, it is clear that those who will be responsible should have a broad knowledge of American society as well as special training in the field.

Thus the first two years of an undergraduate pre-entry training program may well follow the general pattern of our present liberal-college curricula. During the last two years increasing emphasis on technical and professional subjects can be organized into a "major" considerably more concentrated than is general today. At the graduate level professional training can, of course, be carried much further. What is being done in this direction—for instance, by schools of business and other graduate institutions—is already impressive. It is probable that as industrial relations become more complex, there will be an increasing tendency toward carrying pre-entry training to the graduate level.

In addition to the specialized pre-entry training, colleges and universities should also organize a general curriculum in the field of industrial relations, a program that will give to those who do not intend to enter the field professionally a sound basis for understanding. This understanding of the nature and conduct of industrial relations is important for good citizenship, and will become increasingly so to leaders in other fields, who may be expected to emerge in the future, as in the past, from institutions of higher learning. In a required course in contemporary civilization, industrial relations, treated historically and analytically, may well take a recognized and substantial place. If such a course is not offered, one or more courses in the field of economics might be required, with special emphasis on industrial relations. A recent survey<sup>14</sup> indicates that today most of our colleges and universities do provide a wide range of courses bearing on the field. In many institutions, however, it would be useful to intro-

<sup>14</sup> See New York State Joint Legislative Committee . . . , *Report*, 1943 (cited above) pp. 219 ff.

duce a number of more specialized courses than those now found in their curricula.

The college and university can make two other significant contributions to the betterment of industrial relations. Just as the high school can reach out into the community, so can the college and university offer a variety of services to persons engaged in labor or management activities and to the public in general.

One group of these broader-reaching activities lies in the field of in-service training. Short courses of a specialized technical or professional character can be organized both on and off campus for responsible government, industrial and labor representatives. Without outlining the scope of such courses, it is obvious that the fields of administration, law and industrial relations techniques lend themselves to effective academic analysis and appraisal. Such short courses, running from a week to a month or more, can be focused on the specific technical needs of the personnel of an industrial plant or the members of a particular occupational group, or they may be broadened to include the underlying issues of the operating economy. Here the university professional schools can play a particularly important role, since they usually include among their faculties men and women of specialized knowledge often combined with wide experience.

In the field of general community education the record of our institutions of higher education is already significant.<sup>15</sup> As was mentioned above, the organization of extension work for adult education in industrial relations is well established, and considerable expansion of this type of service is already under way in a number of states. But no college or university now conducting extension work has reason to hesitate about increasing its offerings in industrial relations. In educational plans for the postwar period the importance of such services should be recognized.

Regular courses within the accepted framework of university

<sup>15</sup> See C. O. Thompson, *University Extension in Adult Education*, National University Extension Association (Bloomington 1943); New York State Joint Legislative Committee . . . , *Report*, 1943 (cited above) pp. 255 ff.

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extension can profitably be supplemented by experimentation with new media of instruction. Forums and discussion groups, as contrasted with formal courses, will not only reach new audiences but also create new methods for promoting understanding and cooperation. The radio and television can also be utilized to extend the area of academic influence on the community at large.

An interesting development in this aspect of college and university service in industrial relations is the rapidly expanding work of Catholic institutions. Many of them in larger industrial centers are conducting "labor colleges" which reach a far wider public than the Catholic community. These colleges include regular extension courses and are also experimenting with forums and other informal educational techniques. One of the most interesting is the "contract-making seminar" at Rockhurst College, Kansas City, Missouri. Here, for more than two years, a voluntary panel of employer and worker representatives have conducted a bi-weekly session in drafting a model labor contract.<sup>16</sup>

In whatever various ways our colleges and universities carry forward their training programs in industrial relations, their policies and practices should be uniformly animated by a spirit of joint service to both labor and management. Naturally there are certain subject-matter fields which are more relevant to one group than to the other, but if the spirit of cooperation and joint participation is applied to planning curricula and to developing extension programs, new opportunities for bringing together in the same classroom representatives of industry and labor will almost inevitably emerge.

In order to assure that the relations of the college and university with labor groups are as cordial and informed as those with management organizations, greater corporate contacts with unions need to be cultivated. What forms these corporate contacts take will, of course, be determined by local needs and opportunities. The addition by legislative enactment <sup>17</sup> of three repre-

<sup>16</sup> Board of Temporary Trustees . . . , *Report*, 1945 (cited above) pp. 98-99.

<sup>17</sup> L. 1945, Ch. 603.

sentatives "from the field of New York State labor" to the Cornell University Board of Trustees is perhaps the first instance of official labor representation in overall university control. Whether such an arrangement spreads to other private and state institutions is less important than whether cooperative working relations are developed locally in planning and operating particular educational services. The patterns of cooperation will no doubt differ in different communities, and will evolve into new working relationships as experience dictates changes in policies and practices. Joint committees are an obvious device; others will emerge in the context of local needs and interests. In the development of extension services the importance of close cooperation between the college or university and local labor organizations, as well as local management groups, is obvious.

As compared with management groups, organized labor has on the whole been the less closely in touch with, and is the less accustomed to, educational institutions and personnel. The college or university will therefore find it both helpful and sound to take the initiative in making contacts with local labor groups. It can well afford also to take the attitude of learning from them, rather than of trying to teach, in working out cooperative operations.

In addition to its specifically educational activities, the college and university can make two further ancillary contributions to more cooperative industrial relations. One is in the field of research and information for both labor and management. Industrial relations sections (mentioned above), schools of business administration, and many long-range research projects undertaken by university staffs have all rendered significant service in increasing our understanding of special problems in industrial relations. The scope of research in this field is as wide as the range of the relations, conceived in their broadest terms. With the increase in the number of specialized educational agencies in the field, it is probable (and it would certainly be mutually beneficial) that expanded research programs on a cooperative basis will emerge

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in the postwar period. A concerted research analysis of such problems as morale and motivation in industry, long-range social security needs, the economic and social effects of industrial decentralization, would not only advance existing knowledge but contribute to a more stable economy.

Beyond the broader questions of labor-management policies and practices, there is a need also for immediate topical analysis of specific, even local, problems in industrial relations. Here, too, the college and university can make a real contribution to the development of an adequate informational service for its community. The character and content of such a service will, of course, be conditioned by local needs and interests. Educational institutions serve different publics—from the predominantly local to the largely national—and the character of the public should determine the scope and nature of the service.

The second ancillary service which the college and university can perform was touched on above, in another context: experimentation with and development of new media of instruction. The rapid expansion of audio-visual aids to traditional classroom techniques is perhaps the most significant educational advance of the past two decades. The need for new teaching materials and methods, especially in short-course and extension programs in industrial relations, is today acute. Existing facilities for creating and testing audio-visual materials and methods of informal instruction are largely but not exclusively concentrated in the college and university. The contributions of the armed-services instructional programs have been notable. No other field offers greater possibilities than industrial relations for the effective realization of the new techniques. A unique opportunity is here open to the college and university to apply and expand the results of earlier experiments.

#### IV

In addition to the high schools and the institutions of higher education, many other community agencies carry on a wide variety

of activities affecting popular attitudes on industrial relations. Some are specifically organized for education, formal or informal, in industrial relations. Others, intentionally or otherwise, present views on, and stimulate responses to, current issues in labor-management policies and practices. Neither group can be ignored in considering the educational potential in promoting more co-operative industrial relations, for such agencies have already contributed substantially to broader understanding of the nature and conduct of such relations, among their own clienteles or in the community at large.

The first type—agencies specifically designed for education in industrial relations—is perhaps most fully developed within the labor movement itself. For over a quarter-century American labor unions have concerned themselves with broadening the perspectives of their rank and file and with training their leadership in the technical problems of union organization and strategy.

In seeking to achieve the first objective, larger unions have established educational departments whose activities range from all types of educational publications, designed for union members, to forums, discussion groups and lectures conducted within the larger locals. Even when specific educational activities have not been organized separately, most unions issue regular periodicals. Relatively few include an educational page or column, but most of them present indirectly a considerable amount of information on the problems of the industry as well as on union policies and views.<sup>18</sup>

The national labor organizations have also established educational departments, which provide a variety of services to their member organizations. The oldest is the Workers' Education Bureau, established by the AFL in 1921. Through its own publications and through direct aid in developing educational programs of all kinds within individual unions, the Bureau has greatly stimulated interest in education throughout the AFL.

<sup>18</sup> For a definitive index to these publications see L. G. Reynolds and C. C. Killingsworth, *Trade Union Publications* (Baltimore 1944).



The Education and Research Department of the CIO performs essentially the same functions for its member unions.<sup>19</sup>

There is no need for a detailed appraisal here of current activities and trends in workers' education. That its potential is high for promoting wider and more informed understanding of industrial relations has been amply demonstrated. In the postwar period, as these relations shift and become perhaps more tense than ever before, the broadest possible educational program within the labor movement itself can contribute significantly to labor-management cooperation.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to extensive education, the labor movement has developed a number of intensive technical and professional training programs for its leadership. As the movement has been confronted with new problems in organization and negotiation, it has perforce sought to equip its representatives with the necessary skills. As stated earlier in this article, the great increase in governmental regulation of industrial relations during the past two decades has accelerated the demand for experts in collective bargaining, economics, law and other professional fields. In some cases labor unions have gone outside their ranks to "draft" those competent and willing to represent them in collective bargaining and before government agencies. On the other hand, most unions desire, and many have sought, to draw these experts from their own ranks or to add them to their organized staffs as regular union members.

Also for their "middle-management" groups—local officials and business representatives—the unions have found it desirable to

<sup>19</sup> Information on the history and activities of these agencies may be obtained from Workers' Education Bureau of America, 1440 Broadway, New York City, and AFL Building, Washington, D. C.; Education and Research Department, Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1133 Broadway, New York City, and 718 Jackson Place, N. W., Washington, D. C.

<sup>20</sup> For a recent appraisal of the workers' education movement see T. Brameld, ed., *Workers' Education in the United States* (New York 1941). See also the survey included in Board of Temporary Trustees . . . , *Report*, 1945 (cited above) for information on a number of recently organized schools for workers' education, especially in Denver, Los Angeles and San Francisco. An adequate history of these and earlier projects of the same kind does not exist, but would be most useful.

provide more comprehensive information in many new fields. If these leaders of the movement are to function effectively in the complex situations created by expanding governmental regulation and rapid technological change, it is obvious that they must be equipped with the requisite technical and professional data. Many unions have already recognized that their future vitality and effectiveness will depend to a very substantial degree on the quality of their local leadership. That quality will be measured not merely by the leaders' strength and convictions but also by their understanding of the issues that will confront them.

To meet these needs the unions have developed many kinds of in-service training programs for their "top" and "middle" leadership. The programs include intensive training in the "technical-core" subjects, and also broader courses in the "technical-background," "general" and "ancillary" fields.

Technical and professional training is clearly an aspect of workers' education to which the college and university can contribute both usefully and efficiently. Just as many management groups have availed themselves of academic training of this type, it may be anticipated that labor unions will increasingly utilize the facilities of the college and university for specialized as well as general courses.

Thus far only the University of Wisconsin has conducted a sustained program of workers' education, both general and specialized, as an integral segment of university organization.<sup>21</sup> As was noted above, however, a number of university extension services have recently expanded their activities in this direction. An important liaison service between academic and labor groups is developing through the American Labor Education Service,<sup>22</sup> which is currently conducting a survey of workers' education programs in American colleges and universities. The survey will indicate present trends in and reveal possible new lines of co-

<sup>21</sup> See Ernest E. Schwarztrauber, *Workers' Education* (Madison 1942).

<sup>22</sup> The ALES (437 West 59th Street, New York City) also initiates regional conferences on workers' education and carries on research in the field. It offers, too, a consulting service on educational problems for labor unions.

operative educational projects. The industrial relations courses initiated in war production plants by the Engineering, Science and Management War Training Program, most of them conducted by teaching personnel under academic administration, offer an established and highly valuable basis for continued postwar education in local labor (and management) groups.

On the whole, management groups have not developed educational programs as broad as those of labor unions. Management research is, however, more comprehensive and intensive than labor research. The American Management Association has for some time issued two series of bulletins, on personnel and production, summarizing management experience in specific aspects of industrial relations.<sup>23</sup> Many of its bulletins are similar in scope and character to the research publications of university industrial relations sections. The National Industrial Conference Board has conducted a number of short courses and conferences for selected management personnel.<sup>24</sup> Several of the professional engineering societies have also shown increasing interest in industrial relations. Engineering schools are expanding their offerings in the field, and the professional groups are adding a session or two on the subject to the agenda of their annual meetings.

Just as the periodicals of labor unions provide indirect education in industrial relations, the professional journals and trade papers of management groups and trade associations perform this function for their own clienteles. A list of professional personnel-management research and information journals would run to a score or more. There are also the several hundred trade papers which carry more or less regular industrial relations news, and often also specific information of an educational nature. On the fringe of management-directed publications there are the

<sup>23</sup> The Association (330 West 42nd Street, New York City) also has a small consultative and research staff and conducts a number of conferences on special management problems.

<sup>24</sup> The Board (247 Park Avenue, New York City) also issues several series of bulletins on selected labor-management problems. These bulletins are strictly factual and are intended to collate data not otherwise easily available.

various "news letters," not infrequently emanating from ambiguous sources and purveying information of a hearsay or purely speculative nature. The influence of these opinion-creating agencies should not be overlooked in assessing the direction and force of management attitudes on current industrial relations.

Clinging to the periphery of this core of management groups, some operating, others "staff," are the many fee-supported agencies which function in an advisory capacity to management. Some of these carry on at least indirect educational or research activities in industrial relations.

Several types may be distinguished. A number of industrial-relations counseling agencies have grown to national scope in organization and prestige; others operate locally or regionally. As advisers in specific labor-management relations they recommend policies and practices to their clients that affect not only the immediate situation but the overall attitudes and responses of the management groups utilizing their services. Education goes on, even if unconsciously.

Closely related to these agencies are the fee-supported research institutes which have proliferated during the last two decades. They stem, no doubt, from the success of the earlier financial advisory services, and are organized in very much the same way. Their research bulletins and consultant services, in so far as they pertain to industrial relations, are generally of a quality comparable with those of the other management groups and agencies mentioned. Their educational possibilities are great.

Finally, there is a group of publishing services which provide factual data on current administrative and legal developments in industrial relations. Their more comprehensive reports on special questions are usually limited to abstracts of legislation, court decisions and administrative orders, without any expression of opinion on the merits thereof. Even so, they offer not only well-organized and, indeed, indispensable technical information to personnel managers but also a cumulative portrayal of public policy—which is, in itself, an educational resource. A few of

these publishers are projecting texts which may well offer new approaches to and new techniques for the study of industrial relations, in and out of the classroom.

Most of these auxiliary management services have developed during the past decade or so, since government regulation of industrial relations has become pervasive. If, as has been suggested, skill in the conduct of labor-management relations is becoming a primary qualification for business leadership, many of the activities of these agencies may well be absorbed within operating management organizations. In larger corporations education and research in industrial relations will, no doubt, be established even more widely than at present as an integral staff function. Small business may organize its own services, both educational and research, on a cooperative basis. As skill in industrial relations becomes recognized as essential in the middle and lower ranks of supervision and management, as well as at the top level, the techniques and materials of education within industry will be more widely studied and applied.

Since it is unlikely that the trend toward government regulation of industrial relations will be entirely reversed in the postwar period, both industry and labor will be involved in the effort to shape public policy and to function within the governmental administrative process. To the extent that labor-management relations shift from a governmental responsibility to that of a private group, an understanding of mutual interests and of the possibilities of cooperative action will become the more imperative. Education and research by management no less than by unions will therefore remain indispensable tools for promoting more cooperative industrial relations.

V

This brief survey of the educational potential suggests that our established educational institutions, the high school and the college and the university, can play important roles in achieving industrial harmony. As we have seen, their contributions are

already considerable, and their potential services, both general and specific, are wider than usually envisaged.

That education can resolve all of the present discontents in labor-management relations is, of course, not to be anticipated. Resistance to broader understanding of human relations is present in both groups, sometimes from ignorance of or indifference to the values to be achieved through understanding, sometimes from self-interest in perpetuating power or position on the part of dominant individuals or cliques within each group. Educators themselves are often more resistant to these new potentials than industry or labor, because they, too, desire to avoid modifying accepted classroom techniques of teaching ideas and traditional materials. There are also difficulties in developing new subjects, fairly balanced in approach and data, to meet the needs of industry and labor. Further problems arise in establishing a curriculum which combines an adequate cultural background and a sufficient technical and professional training. Nevertheless, whether the resistances come from within the educational arcanum or from without the college and university halls, the potential services of education in this field are not less vital or significant because they are not universally accepted.

These services run in two broad channels, both of which are peculiarly the function of organized education as its purposes have evolved over the centuries. One is in increasing technical and professional competence and in exploring, with research tools refined by experience, the frontiers of knowledge. In each of these directions organized education can provide more useful services to both labor and management. In a number of areas of education and research, as we have seen, one or the other group has forged instruments of its own shaping and for its own uses. The college and especially the university can push out their own boundaries of education and research, not only to aid the joint operations of both groups but to make their separate activities more efficient and objective. As organized education seeks to perform its traditional function in this dynamic field of human



relations, it will discover fresh opportunities. New areas and modes of education will emerge, wider horizons of research will open, to those who devote themselves to making industrial relations more cooperative.

The other broad channel within which organized education functions is the development of common ideals and objectives in the community. In a democratic society these ideals and objectives must be related to promoting the general welfare, by means of democratic processes and in the spirit of human freedom and equality. The democratic process assumes a common heritage, a common participation, joint action in a spirit of cooperation for common goals. Here the high school, as well as the college and university, shares both opportunity and responsibility.

The way in which more harmonious industrial relations are linked with the wider democratic goal has been well expressed in another context by the New York committee already referred to: "The most satisfactory and happiest human relationships are the product not of legal compulsion, but rather of voluntary determination among human beings to cooperate with one another. Though we may legislate to the end of time, there will never be industrial peace and harmony without good faith, integrity, a high degree of responsibility, and a real desire to cooperate on the part of all parties concerned. Without this spirit of goodwill, all of the social, economic, and labor laws of man will prove eventually to be in vain."<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> New York State Joint Legislative Committee . . . , *Report* (Leg. Doc., 1940, No. 57) p. 77.

# ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES IN THE MOUNTAIN REGIONS

BY HANS NEISSER

THE European traveler crossing the western mountain ranges of this country for the first time is surprised by nothing more than by the vast emptiness of these regions—a density of population so low that he travels for a dozen, even a hundred miles without encountering inhabited areas. The high mountains of Europe have accustomed him to quite a different picture. The peaks of Switzerland and the Tyrol do not rise to lesser heights than those of the Rocky Mountains and the Sierra Nevada; but more than 160 inhabitants per square mile can be counted there, while not much more than 5 are found in the American mountains.

It is true that the Rocky Mountains and the related ranges of the American Far West are not, to the same extent as the Alps, in the proximity of densely populated industrial regions whose traveling habits have provided a rich source of revenue to the inhabitants of the mountains, and whose economies have constituted a receptive market for whatever goods the mountain regions could produce and export. Above all, the opportunities for agriculture in these semi-arid regions of the United States are much more limited than those of Switzerland, with her ample rainfall, and thus a flourishing agriculture could not develop here as a source of demand for industrial and mining produce. Yet the traveler may well ask one question: could not these disadvantages be offset, at least to some extent, by the rich mineral resources of the Rocky Mountains which are described in his guidebook and which the Alps, especially in the western part, lack almost completely? Here, indeed, would be a task for American ingenuity, to replace the traditional agricultural basis of population growth by a technological basis, and to end a state of affairs in which a third of the continent supports a population

not even equal to that of so small a country as Denmark. Certainly in the sixties of the last century, when the struggle for free soil beyond the borders of Missouri and Iowa was fought on the battlefields of Virginia and Tennessee, a quite different future was foreseen for the great plains and the adjacent mountains.

The main factor retarding the development of the vast resources of these areas is undoubtedly the lack of transportation facilities. Water transportation is out of the question in mountain or semi-desert regions, and only a few big railroad trunk lines cross the western half of the continent. All that the railroad fever in the nineteenth century achieved for the mountains was the construction of 3 miles of track per hundred square miles. Switzerland, by way of comparison, has 22 miles of track per hundred square miles.

The most interesting aspect of this situation is the light that it sheds on the nature of the free enterprise system. Free enterprise invests in a going concern, in a market which is provided with sufficient purchasing power and which, in general, admits of no serious doubt about the effective demand for the products to be offered. But free enterprise cannot so easily develop regions that are to *become* such markets in the future, only by the process of development. In other words, it is not beyond the capacity of free enterprise to construct railroads where there already exists freight to be transported, freight that was previously transported by water or road. But what is the profit outlook for a railroad in regions which become capable of supporting habitation and production only through and after the construction of the railroad itself? And on the other hand, how can people be expected to settle on a large scale in uninhabited regions, in particular, to develop the production of commodities for wider markets, unless the transportation facilities are already present?

Plainly nothing will happen if the railroads wait for the mines, the farms and the factories to develop, and the mines, farms and factories wait for the railroads. Simultaneous or "complementary" investment in both transportation and production is

required to break such a deadlock. But the free enterprise system is not geared to complementary investment, precisely *because* it is based on individual and not on coordinated action. It moves forward with great force where some effective demand already exists. Then it develops the size of the market and the volume of purchasing power step by step to higher levels, each new venture in an individual industry creating effective demand and purchasing power for other new ventures. In well developed economic regions complementary investment may not be indispensable, and individual investment may do the trick. In new fields, however, the latter needs assistance.

In the heyday of the free enterprise system, particularly in the railroad age of the nineteenth century, this fact was well known. Uninhibited by fear of nationalization or government planning, capitalists did not hesitate to take the necessary steps to overcome the basic deadlock described above. Not even in Europe were the railroads actually developed by the free enterprise system alone, although there a relatively dense population and the economic activities of 250 years of capitalism had built up a volume of traffic sufficient to support a network of railroads. Even there the risk appeared too great, and an elaborate system of government subsidies in the form of dividend guarantees and interest guarantees was necessary to overcome the hesitation of capitalists. In this country, too, the maxims of the *laissez faire* age proved no obstacle to far-reaching subsidies, especially in the form of land grants. We may deplore the enormous amount of fraud, corruption and waste associated with the development of railroads on this and other continents. But this should not blind us to the simple fact that some such measures were indispensable if railroads were to be built and the age of highly efficient production was to be ushered in—that age which is rightly praised as the triumph of the free enterprise system, pure and simple, and which never would have materialized if the promoters had dogmatically clung to the system as such during the initial phase of its development.

The real difficulties do not lie in the possible misuses of any system of railroad subsidies, especially dividend guarantees and interest guarantees. Ample experience is available to enable us to avoid such pitfalls. Furthermore, the promotion of railroads in undeveloped regions could be undertaken as a government project without any serious threat to the system of free enterprise in general. The real difficulties lie elsewhere. There are already a number of railroads crossing the mountain states. If these regions were further developed, a considerable amount of trade and revenue would accrue to those older railroad enterprises, and thus would not be available to cover the costs and create earnings for new ones. The government, however, might be asked to make up the losses of the new railroad enterprises while the old ones made an unearned profit.

The problem is well known in the history of public finance, because public works of all kinds have always raised the economic value of existing private enterprises or real estate. No general method has been devised for completely balancing the costs of the public enterprise and the unearned gains of the private ones. In any concrete case, however, there is usually a way out. In the matter under discussion it would consist in reorganizing the railroads running through the western part of the country in such a way that under a new system of government guarantees they could feel encouraged to develop the transportation system of the mountain states in the desired direction.

The development of transportation facilities is, of course, only the first step. Of equal importance is the development of new sources of power. But enough has been written about these possibilities since the dramatic success of TVA. It suffices here to point out that this is another field where the application of government guarantees could foster a huge flow of investment for years to come, without implying an actual burden on the federal budget. All such ventures are bound to yield an adequate return to capital, comparable to what people can now draw from government securities, providing only that the deadlock is broken

and that a huge region now inhabited by only a few hundred thousand people is converted into a going concern expanding over several decades.

But where are those unexploited treasures? Can we be sure that so much exists in addition to the considerable resources already developed? Could not the rest of the mountain region, at least in this respect, resemble Switzerland, which, as was pointed out before, is almost devoid of mineral resources? There is, indeed, not much information to be obtained from the usual textbooks on economic geography, or even from the Minerals Yearbook. Both are written with great caution, and concern themselves much more with a faithful description of what has been done in developing the mountain regions than with the opportunities of the future. There is little doubt, however, that leading corporations and capitalists in the eastern states have taken an optimistic view and have followed it up by large-scale preliminary acquisitions, even though they may not be interested in making these facts widely known. And their optimistic opinions are confirmed by independent authorities. Let me quote one leading economic geographer.

According to Russell Smith, the region of the southern Rocky Mountains promises "for the future two industries of gigantic proportions" (phosphate and oil shale). "The central Rockies contain the world's greatest known phosphate beds. . . . It is a misfortune that it lies so far from the market." The region "would at least supply six millions [five times the present population] with apples, peas, grapes, peaches, cherries, small fruits, garden stuff, all the milk, butter, potatoes. It would also produce all the meat they would need and most of the thirty-six million bushels of wheat that they would eat." Of great importance, besides the reference to the two new industries, is what Smith says about the large secondary investment in the field of agriculture which would ensue if a start were made in investment in railroads and mining.

Further data about the natural resources in this region can



be gathered even from the available geological-statistical material, as is evident from several publications of the National Resources Committee. In a study on "Industrial Development of the Mountain States" (December 1942) the committee declares that the region covering Colorado, New Mexico and Wyoming "is credited with having the largest reserves of bituminous and sub-bituminous coal, molybdenum, vanadium, oil shale, uranium and, possibly, zinc in the United States." There are "large deposits of iron ore in Wyoming and to a lesser extent in Colorado and New Mexico." These conclusions are firmly supported by the findings of K. Leith and D. M. Liddell in their pamphlet, "Mineral Reserves of the United States," issued six years earlier on behalf of the committee. The latter pamphlet refers, too, to the deposits of magnesite in Utah and Nevada, of potash in New Mexico and of tungsten in Arizona, which await further development. There can be little doubt that even this list does not nearly exhaust the possibilities, and that the development of the region through appropriate transportation facilities would create the opportunity to explore the vast stretches that are today scarcely known and scarcely accessible.

Let us examine, finally, the order of magnitude of such a development. Railroad mileage per thousand square miles amounts, in the Rocky Mountain states (Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Idaho), to only 34.7 miles, and in the entire mountain region to 28.3, in contrast to 225 in Switzerland. Thus even if we added a further 25,000 miles of railroad track in the mountain region as a whole, we would still be very much below the Swiss rate.

To be sure, the mileage per thousand persons is higher in the mountain states than in Switzerland (5.7 compared with 0.9), but that is due only to the very low density of the population. If Russell Smith's goal of 6 million inhabitants in the southern Rocky Mountain states were realized, and if the population of other mountain states were increased by, let us say, 150 percent, making a total of 10 million in the whole region, we would still be

very far from the population density in Switzerland, for we would then have 12 inhabitants per square mile here, compared with 160 per square mile there (of which 100 are supported outside agriculture). And even with these increases in population as well as mileage, the mileage per thousand persons would still be no more than 5 in the American mountain regions, in contrast to Switzerland's 0.9.

The advantages of such a program for the country as a whole would be twofold. In the first place, there is a considerable amount of current investment in railroads, public utilities, mining, agricultural trade and the like. And the key position which an adequate flow of investment holds for the maintenance of employment is now generally acknowledged. It can therefore be said that in developing the western mountain regions this country would take a great step toward solving the employment problem without experiencing all the complications inherent in investment in foreign countries. The sums involved would be considerable. Railroads that conform to modern standards of durability cost from \$200,000 to \$300,000 per mile; thus for 25,000 miles the investment would amount to 5 to 7.5 billion dollars. And this amount should be trebled if we include the secondary investment (public and private) in public utilities, mining, services, trade and agriculture, made possible by the improvement of transportation facilities.

In the second place, this development would contribute considerably to removing one of the greatest impediments to the full utilization of our labor power, that is, the threatening shortage of raw materials. During the war the government had to pay premium prices in order to obtain a relatively small additional supply of critical raw materials. If in order to have full employment we must continue to pay high prices for raw materials, the cost of living cannot fail to rise, and we shall be confronted with an inflationary spiral wherein higher prices lead to higher wages and higher wages lead to higher prices. From this point of view the development of new and presumably not too costly mineral

resources could prove of the utmost importance for a solution of the employment problem.

But even more important than these two achievements would be a change in our attitude toward the problems of investment in general. We are too easily satisfied with either eulogizing the performance of the system of free enterprise or, conversely, seeing all salvation in public deficit spending of whatever dimensions required. Actually it is vision, more than anything else, which is necessary in order to reach a state of full employment at a fair wage level and to maintain it for more than a transitory period. And in the region of the western mountains we have opportunities, badly neglected, yet obviously very promising, for investment within the boundaries of the United States.

# THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD

BY FELIX KAUFMANN

## I

**M**ETHODS of scientific inquiry are usually interpreted as means to the end of finding "hidden" truths. Some truths, it is held, are immediately given—by sense perception or self-perception or by intuitive understanding of meanings; no effort is involved in grasping them. Other truths, however, have to be discovered by purposive activity which, when it reaches a certain scope and elaboration, is called "scientific inquiry." The term "scientific method," used in the singular, designates a pattern common to all such inquiries; used in the plural it designates specific patterns of inquiry. Like other means or tools, a particular scientific method may be more or less conducive to the attainment of the desired goal. If it does not lead to the expected result it may be modified, or even abandoned entirely and replaced by another method.

Methodology, then, is conceived of either as a description and systematic classification of actually adopted methods, that is, as a descriptive discipline, or as a totality of precepts for the proper conduct of scientific inquiries, in other words, as a normative discipline.

Sound as this conception of scientific method may seem, it is open to a serious objection emerging from an analysis of the meaning of "truth" in empirical science. According to the classical conception of truth, a proposition is either true or false in itself, and it is invariably true or invariably false. Scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is not invariably established. One of the essential traits of the method of empirical science is that it provides for a potentially permanent control on any accepted proposition. In other words, no proposition concerning matters

of fact is regarded as incontrovertible. Recognition may be withdrawn, and the proposition may even be replaced by another that is logically incompatible with it.

Accordingly, knowledge of matters of fact is frequently contrasted with the rational knowledge embodied in logic and pure mathematics—the one merely probable, the other absolutely certain. This contrast is likely to suggest the idea that empirical knowledge is an *approximation* of rational truth. But such an interpretation of empirical knowledge is untenable. It would mean that a statement scientifically established today, and also its negation established tomorrow, have to be regarded as approximations of truth—which does not make sense.

Hence we cannot define the goals of scientific inquiry in terms of a conception of invariable truth. It is the desire of the scientist to incorporate into his science propositions that can stand up under further examination, but he can never be sure that any proposition will remain valid under all possible tests, as there is no end to potential checking.

A proposition has to meet definite requirements, however, in order to be accepted in a science. The requirements are referred to in the declaration that unfounded statements cannot be accepted in a science, that the acceptance must be warranted by sufficient grounds. This gives rise to the question, what is meant by "ground"? This term is used with two different meanings, and in distinguishing one from the other we shall come closer to an understanding of the fundamentals of scientific method.

The term "ground" may designate the relation between premises and conclusion in deductive reasoning. Thus when we say that the conjunction of the two propositions, "All men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man," is a ground for the proposition, "Socrates is mortal," we mean that the third proposition is entailed in the conjunction of the other two. Generally speaking, in deductive inference (including mathematical proofs) we perform a process of clarification, but do not arrive at a new proposition. Things are different, however, when we accept statements about single

facts on the basis of reported perceptual experiences, or when we accept scientific laws on the basis of acknowledged facts—more accurately, on the basis of accepted propositions asserting these facts. In such cases we add to our knowledge not only in a psychological but also in a logical sense; we incorporate new propositions into our science.

Thus we are using the term "ground" in a sense differing from that which it has in deductive logic when we say that reports about perceptual experience are grounds for the acceptance of fact statements, or that acknowledged facts are grounds for the acceptance of laws. In what follows I shall use the term "ground" only in the second sense. In view of the further fact that not only the acceptance of propositions into the corpus of a science but also the elimination of previously accepted propositions must be warranted, the term "ground" will be used in reference to both types of changes in the corpus of a science, and the term "scientific decision" will be introduced to designate either kind of change. It is then apparent that the two statements, "The scientific decision *d* is (scientifically) correct" and "The scientific decision *d* is warranted by sufficient grounds," are synonymous.

Now let us imagine a scientific controversy, for example, a controversy between biologists A and B about whether acquired habits are transmitted to the offspring. A defends this thesis and supports it by what he considers sufficient grounds for its acceptance. B may, in contesting the thesis, advance two different types of argument. He may either declare that the statements to which A referred as grounds are not scientifically established; or he may grant that they are established but argue that A's thesis cannot be legitimately inferred from them—in other words, that these statements are not sufficient grounds for the acceptance of A's thesis.

It is the latter type of argument with which we are here concerned. A may react to it by asking: Why is my inference not legitimate? This question does not aim at eliciting a causal explanation from B; the latter is challenged rather to substantiate



his claim that A's inference is not in accordance with the established canons of inductive inference. To meet this challenge B will have to list the rules of inductive inference which he considers to be established, and to show that A's inference is not covered by them. A may then either try to prove that his inference is indeed in accordance with the canons listed by B (and acknowledged by himself) or he may make the point that his inference is in accordance with canons not listed by B but generally adopted among scientists, and that the inference is therefore correct.

I have introduced this example in order to make it clear that the distinction between correct inference and incorrect inference is in terms of presupposed rules of inference, just as the distinction between legal and illegal actions is in terms of presupposed legal rules, or as the distinction between grammatically correct and incorrect ways of speech is in terms of presupposed rules of grammar. In stating that a certain action is illegal or that a certain manner of speech is grammatically incorrect without referring to the standard (criterion) of correctness, we use an elliptical formulation; and the same is true if we criticize a scientific decision as unwarranted without referring to the presupposed canons of scientific procedure in terms of which "warranted (unwarranted) scientific decision" is defined.

This analogy is open to the objection that the canons of legal action in a certain country and those of correct speech in a particular language are explicitly given, in legal codes and grammar textbooks respectively, whereas only a few rules of empirical procedure have been precisely formulated. But this objection can be countered by pointing out that we may be in a similar position in dealing with customary law, or with syntactic constructions not referred to in grammar books. We may then have to make explicit the standards of legality that are actually acknowledged, though not explicitly formulated, by courts, or the standards of grammatical correctness that are actually adopted by respected writers.

The task of making explicit the canons of scientific procedure actually observed by competent scientists is the chief task of methodology. We must, as Dewey says in the preface to his *Logic*, "bring logical theory into accord with scientific practice."

The objection countered above is associated with the view that only some questions concerning the correctness of scientific decisions permit of answers, while others do not. But this view cannot be upheld. An analogy will illuminate this point. Suppose we are asked over the telephone by a man who does not indicate where he is, "How far away is George Washington Bridge?" We may then tell him politely, "I am sorry, sir, I cannot answer your question unless you tell me where you are." But the logically appropriate, though less polite, response would be: "Since you did not indicate the point whose distance from George Washington Bridge should be made known to you, you have not asked a proper question." Nor does a man ask a proper (unambiguous) question concerning the correctness of a scientific decision when he omits reference to the canons of correctness. Once this is recognized it becomes apparent that no completely formulated question of this kind is unanswerable. The given canons of scientific procedure determine what propositions are sufficient grounds for the scientific decision at issue; and the decision is warranted if and only if such propositions belong to the body of established knowledge at the time of the decision.

I shall call the body of knowledge established at a certain time the "scientific situation at this time." Given the rules of procedure, the correctness or incorrectness of any scientific decision is uniquely determined by the scientific situation at this time. A correct scientific decision by which a proposition *p* is incorporated into a science will be called "verification of *p*," and a correct scientific decision by which a previously incorporated proposition *p* is eliminated from science, "invalidation of *p*." If the invalidation of a proposition is accompanied by the incorporation of a proposition logically incompatible with it, I shall speak of the "falsification of *p*."

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## II

Considering that all scientific activity is meant to result directly or indirectly in changes of the body of knowledge, we are led to conclude that the nucleus of the logic of empirical science (methodology) is analysis of the rules of procedure determining the criteria of correct scientific decisions in given scientific situations. This is perhaps most easily recognized by an analysis of the correlative terms "problem" and "solution." To solve a problem is to find a correct answer to a given question, or more precisely, to verify a logically possible answer to the question. To many questions—for example, "What is the number of chemical elements?"—there is an unlimited number of logically possible answers. It cannot be decided by logical reasoning that the number of elements is 92. Any other number of elements would be possible. But not every possible answer is a solution of the problem posed by the question; and we cannot explicitly state what we mean by "solution" without referring to the canons of procedure in terms of which we distinguish between warranted and unwarranted scientific decisions.

This state of affairs, however, has been obscured time and again by the following argument: the most momentous scientific achievements were not realized by a procedure in conformity with established rules, but rather in violation of the rules, and these achievements have led to the establishment of new rules superseding the old. If Galileo had observed the rules of physical inquiry generally accepted at the end of the sixteenth century he would never have become a founder of classical physics; and if Planck, Einstein and Bohr had observed the rules of physical inquiry generally adopted at the beginning of the twentieth century they would not have become the founders of quantum physics. Hence it is not the conformity of a theory with given rules that matters in its evaluation, but its success.

Prima facie this argument seems to carry substantial weight, but it cannot bear closer scrutiny. This becomes clear as soon as we ask what are the criteria of the success of a theory. The

answer expected will be that a theory is successful if it is confirmed by facts—in other words, if predictions in terms of the theory are in conformity with results of observation. But in the very formulation of this definition of “success” we have referred to one type of rules of scientific procedure, indeed, the most important type—the rules of the observational test. It is therefore misleading if the evaluation of a theory in terms of conformity with accepted rules is contrasted with its evaluation in terms of success.

The success of a prediction and of the general hypothesis on which it rests does not imply that either was warranted at the time it was made. A prediction may be warranted and successful, warranted but unsuccessful, unwarranted but successful, unwarranted and unsuccessful. And the same classification applies to general assumptions (hypotheses). A scientist may show his acumen and even his genius in predicting an event in terms of a not yet sufficiently confirmed law, but he cannot justly claim in such a case that his prediction was scientifically established at the time he made it. While we frequently regard the initial conception of a subsequently verified scientific hypothesis as the decisive event in the pertinent context of inquiry, we do not refer to it in the process of verification. We must be wary of confounding the psychological analysis of scientific discoveries, and the evaluation of such accomplishments, with the logical analysis of the distinction between genuine discoveries and pseudo-discoveries. This distinction, as we have seen, is in terms of rules of scientific procedure.

It is one of the chief tasks of methodological analysis to show the interrelations of the observational test with other types of scientific control. Here only some general remarks can be offered, relating to epistemological issues. If the testing of fact statements in the strict sense (synthetic singular propositions) and of empirical laws (synthetic universal propositions) were reducible to correspondence with data of sense perception or self-perception, as some proponents of theories of immediate experience would

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have us believe, then the fundamentals of methodology, if not its technical details, would be a rather simple matter. But it has been shown time and again—in our time most convincingly by pragmatists, operationalists and Gestalt psychologists—that such a view is untenable.

It is impossible to isolate perceptual content from principles of form. Every perceptual experience involves processes of selection in conformity with certain general patterns. This means that theory is implicit even in the most “simple” experiences. The view that assertions are tested by confrontation with “pure sensory experience” is therefore an inadequate interpretation of the observational test. This is more obvious when physical instruments, such as telescopes or microscopes, are used in the observation and the “theory of the instruments”—for example, optical principles relating to lenses—comes into play. But there is no fundamental difference in this respect between observation performed with the aid of instruments and observation by the naked eye.

It follows that we cannot contrast theory and observation (or theory and fact) in the way in which it has usually been done. The nature of the observational test and its key role in scientific procedure cannot be thoroughly understood without determining its place within the frame of the whole system of procedural rules. Unless we do this we are unable to account for the fact that the significance of a single positive instance—or of any given number of positive instances—for the verification of a proposed scientific law may be very different in different contexts. After Einstein had predicted in terms of his general theory of relativity that a “bending” of light-rays would be observable during solar eclipses, and had given precise numerical values for the “curvature,” it was considered a very strong corroboration of his theory when a rather small number of observations actually performed were virtually in conformity with his prediction. But even a much greater number of positive instances and the absence of negative instances may be considered insufficient for the accept-

ance of a hypothesis that does not fit into the general theoretical frame of a science.

These remarks apply to the invalidation and falsification of propositions no less than to their verification. Here too the usual interpretation of scientific procedure has oversimplified the structure of this procedure by separating too sharply the observational test from other elements of control. Most of us have been taught that any law understood as a pattern for predictions must be dropped if one prediction in terms of it on the basis of acknowledged facts is not fulfilled. But actually there are many laws (including all social laws) that are not considered falsifiable by one negative instance.

For a historical understanding of the inadequate traditional view one has to recall the persistent controversy between rationalists and empiricists. Extreme rationalists maintained that "pure reason," conceived as speculation about the final causes of the created world and its perfection, may yield indubitable knowledge of facts and physical laws, and that conflicting sense experiences ought to be dismissed as mere illusions. As modern science took shape in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it engaged in a bitter struggle with rationalism of this kind, and when it eventually emerged as the victor the pendulum swung too far in the opposite direction. Reason was dethroned by "tough-minded" empiricists and sense perception proclaimed as the absolute ruler.

Few of the great scientists supported this revolution wholeheartedly. They knew too well how much of theory—general assumptions as guiding principles of selection or interpretation—is implicit in the supposedly bare facts. But reputable social statisticians, flourishing in the first decades of our century, were still prone to contrast theory and fact and to emphasize their reliance on "undiluted" facts. While they too aimed at discovering laws, they indulged in the belief that such laws are uniquely determined by observed facts. Ultimately, however, some rather disappointing experiences—for example, those connected with the

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so-called Harvard barometer for the prediction of business cycles—led to a more thorough reflection on the implicit theoretical assumptions in statistical inquiry, with the result that social statistics has now reached a level of theoretical elaboration and clarity concerning its basic general assumptions hardly surpassed by any other approach in social science. Scientists—social as well as natural scientists—have thus come to realize that the sharp contrast between theory and fact, combined with emphasis on the primacy and indubitability of immediate experience, is bound to lead to misinterpretations of actually adopted scientific methods and to impair the progress of inquiry.

### III

The conclusions thus far obtained are open to the following stricture: these results seem to imply, it may be argued, that the rules of scientific procedure are invariable, whereas it is plain that previously established scientific methods, no less than scientific results, are liable to be superseded by new ones as inquiry progresses. This argument brings into focus a very important methodological issue, but it misses the essential point. I do not maintain that the rules are unalterable, but only that they are presupposed as unequivocally established *in a given scientific situation.*

Reference to the criteria of legally correct behavior will help to illuminate this point. It is obvious that the norms of substantive law of a given legal order, in terms of which legally correct (incorrect) behavior is defined, are subject to change. And the same is true of norms governing the legislative process. But the question whether a particular human action is legal is not thereby rendered ambiguous. The legality of the action is judged in terms of norms in existence at a definite time, in many cases the time at which the action was performed. The jurist who has to decide such a question is therefore confronted with what may be called a problem of juristic statics. But this does not blind him to the fact that there are problems of "juristic dynamics"

concerned with the legally established conditions for alterations of legal rules, though he will insist that these two types of problems—problems *de lege lata* and problems *de lege ferenda*—should not be confounded.

Similarly, problems concerning the appropriateness (correctness) of changes in the procedural rules of scientific inquiry are most important, methodologically, but they should not be confounded with problems concerning the correctness of scientific decisions in terms of given rules. In asking whether it is correct to change a procedural rule we presuppose another rule, in terms of which such correctness is defined.

But it is easily seen that there must be some limit to changes in the rules of scientific procedure. If there were not some invariant principles constitutive of scientific method as such, the term "scientific method" could not be assigned any definite meaning. Here again the analogy with the structure of a legal order may be helpful: in stressing the unity of a legal order in spite of changes in its norms, we presuppose the invariance of certain principles constitutive of this unity.

The invariant principles of scientific procedure are not embedded in single rules; they are properties of the system of procedural rules. Some of the more important of these principles are:

a) The grounds of a scientific decision must be among the propositions belonging to the scientific situation to which the decision is related;

b) Observational reports (protocol propositions) play a key role among the grounds;

c) All scientific decisions are reversible (principle of permanent control);

d) A scientific decision must not lead to a scientific situation containing two incompatible propositions (procedural correlate of the principle of contradiction);

e) No proposition can be in principle undecidable (procedural correlate of the principle of the excluded middle).

These principles are *a priori* for science, in the sense that a system of rules of procedure regulating the acceptance of propositions, or the elimination of previously accepted propositions, which did not comprise these principles would not be called a system of rules of scientific procedure. We should not, for example, be ready to call a procedure scientific in which the observational test was replaced by a dream test. But the principles are not *a priori* in the sense of being derivable from an intuitive understanding of propositional meanings, as are the rules of deductive reasoning. There is no *ultimate* rational justification for any statement concerning rules of procedure.

As far as rules of induction are concerned, Hume made this point perfectly clear, but he did not fully grasp the implications contained in the problem of making explicit the standards of inquiry actually adopted by scientists. We still have a long road to travel toward this goal, particularly in the social sciences. But once the general direction has been determined we shall be able to cope with certain issues of social philosophy that have been in the foreground of discussion during the past decades and have notably influenced the intellectual temper of our age. A brief examination of one of these issues—the objectivity of social science—will aid us in appraising the function of methodology within the frame of social research.

The recognition that there is no ultimate rational justification of the procedure of empirical science leads directly to the idea that the activity of the scientist, like any other human activity, should be appraised in terms of its appropriateness for the promotion of vital human ends. Scientific inquiry, it is pointed out, leads to the formation of beliefs of certain kinds which determine to a great extent the actions we perform. It is decided by the success or failure of these actions whether the beliefs from which they emanated are sound, and this in turn reflects upon the methods of thinking which produced these beliefs. Since men belonging to different social groups have different, in many instances even conflicting, interests (for example, entrepreneurs

and workers) we should not take it for granted that they hold the same fundamental beliefs and adopt the same methods of formation of beliefs. They have different "perspectives" which can be explained in terms of their social existence but cannot be ultimately justified or refuted by reason. These differences are of little import in the natural sciences, because those sciences deal with matters in which there is a goal common to all men—adaptation to the physical environment and mastery over the forces of nature—but they are highly significant in the social sciences, where the impact of conflicting goals makes itself felt. It is therefore impossible to make good the claim that there is in social science one standard of truth established for all mankind.

Those who attack this relativistic doctrine are prone to declare that facts and laws are independent of our awareness of them, and that it is the goal of inquiry to produce statements that are in conformity with reality. But this argument is not likely to shatter the position of the relativists. They may counter it by stressing that it is impossible to justify by experience any statement about things-(or facts)-in-themselves. Relativism in general, and historicism and sociology in particular, cannot be refuted by any claims about "absolutes" transcending possible human experience.

This is not to say that relativism is unassailable, but it indicates that the relativist's position must be attacked from within rather than from above. In plain words, it must be shown that the relativist's thesis is not in accordance with certain standards of scientific procedure which he himself has implicitly adopted. In the first place, he will have to admit that these standards, which provide for the invalidation of any previously accepted statements concerning matters of fact, are incompatible with his assumption that a set of basic beliefs conditioned by a man's social existence is invariable in the course of inquiry. Furthermore, he will have to grant that some fundamental properties of the rules of scientific procedure are formal, that is, invariant with respect to changes in the subject matter of inquiry, and that accordingly they are

beyond the struggle of conflicting group interests. And finally, he will have to concede that the validity of the rules of procedure is not touched by the fact that men find it difficult to live up to these rules by freeing themselves from cherished prejudices which seem to lend support to their interests.

The effect that such reflections may have upon an honest and courageous thinker becomes apparent in the writings of Karl Mannheim, the leading proponent of the sociology of knowledge. Like Balaam of the Scriptures he came to curse and remained to bless. He started by radicalizing the ideology concept and uprooting the idea of objective truth in social science, only to arrive eventually at the conclusion that the limitations of the different socially-conditioned aspects may be overcome and a "synthesis" performed by independent thinkers. He still contends that independent thinkers (*freischwebende Intelligenz*) can emerge only under specific conditions, but this thesis is irrelevant for the issue of the objectivity of social science.

This issue can be settled as soon as we realize that "objectivity" (objective validity) is relative to presupposed canons of scientific procedure. An objectively valid belief is a scientifically established belief, and the rules of procedure determine what we mean by "scientifically established." The possibility of persistent disagreement about the rules of procedure among members of different social groups cannot be denied, but actually there is hardly any disagreement noticeable so far as the more significant rules are concerned, and no disagreement at all with respect to the fundamental properties of the system of rules listed above.

An appearance to the contrary is created by the fact that excessive claims have frequently been made for particular approaches to problems of social policy, approaches which sometimes reflect group interests. But it is only these claims, and not the approaches themselves, that are incompatible with a just appraisal of other approaches. There is, for instance, a multiplicity of factors to which social events of a given kind can be causally imputed, and accordingly there is a variety of approaches by which the

event to be explained can be correlated with each of these factors. These approaches are not incompatible with one another. The claim that any of them has discovered *the* cause of the event is indeed incompatible with the appropriateness of other approaches, but this claim can be refuted in terms of generally recognized rules of procedure.

Moreover, the question of the extent of actual consensus with regard to the rules is not a question with which the logic of science (methodology) is concerned. If there were indeed far-reaching disagreement among "differently situated" persons with respect to the rules, this would render impossible genuine scientific discussion among them, unless they agreed to accept one particular system of rules for the sake of the argument. But it should be noted that this disagreement, if it existed, would pertain not to matters of fact but to the meaning of terms such as "knowledge," "ground," "warranted," "validity."

#### IV

The chief objective of the foregoing analysis was to drive home one point: that no study of more or less specific scientific methods, and no attempt to classify the chief varieties of methods and reveal their interrelations, can penetrate to the bottom of the issues unless it rests on a clear understanding of scientific method as such. We cannot properly describe the diversities without a clear grasp of the fundamental unity.

What are usually called "scientific methods" are patterns for the solution of given types of problems, that is, standards in terms of which the presumable relevance of approaches to given problems is appraised. In other words, the belief that an approach following this pattern will lead to a solution of the given problem is considered by the scientist to be a rational (correct) belief. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility of disappointment, which may lead to a change in adopted methods. But the essential point in the context of our analysis is that the terms "problem" and "methods for the solution of a problem" are defined



in terms of "correct scientific decision," and hence in terms of rules of scientific procedure.

We have therefore to distinguish between two types of rules of procedure—rules that do not contain reference to problems and their solutions, and rules that contain such reference—and to note that rules of the former type are presupposed in rules of the latter type. We may call the former "basic rules" and the latter "preference rules." The preference rules, which outline patterns of inquiry, are in the foreground of the scientist's attention, but this should not make him disregard their logical dependence upon basic rules.

It is appropriate to add a few words about the significance of methodological analysis for social practice. We know only too well that it is impossible to settle by argument all human conflicts between single persons or social groups. But we know too that many conflicts may indeed be settled by argument, and most of us will be prepared to endorse the trend toward settling a larger proportion of conflicts in this manner.

A prerequisite of an efficient promotion of this goal in the long run is the clarification of the meaning of "scientific discussion." Those who conceive of it as a struggle with words, which is, after all, not so very different from a struggle with fists or guns, will more readily resort to the weapons of force than those who recognize it as a means toward the end of mutual understanding based on self-understanding. The intellectually honest man who has become aware of the fact that an argument is in terms of rules implicitly adopted by himself will be as good a loser in a discussion as he is expected to be in a baseball game or a tennis match.

Moreover, it is widely recognized that the future of mankind will substantially depend upon how far it will succeed in dispensing with prejudices, and many of us feel that one of the foremost tasks of moral education is to counteract the inclinations toward prejudice. But we cannot free ourselves from prejudices unless we are able to distinguish a prejudice from a warranted belief, unless we grasp the criteria of warranted belief, that is,

the rules of scientific procedure. We cannot assume full responsibility for our judgments—fact statements or value judgments—if we are not clear about how their validity is established.

This conclusion is by no means a new insight. It is indeed as old as philosophy, and was emphatically proclaimed by Plato. But it is not inseparably connected with the rationalist's conception of empirical science as an imperfect substitute for rational science, a makeshift rendered necessary by man's finitude. We perform the separation by disclosing the structure of empirical science, that is, by methodological analysis. The ideal of clarity is common to empiricist and rationalist doctrines, and it will be a guide in the liberal education of the future, as it was in Plato's Academy.

# SOME CRITICAL REMARKS ON MAN'S SCIENCE OF MAN

BY KURT RIEZLER

## I

**T**HOUGH many sciences deal with man, there is no science of man. Man has been cut into pieces and distributed among different departments of research. The number of pieces increases as the quantity of our knowledge increases. Yet man goes on being one.

The many sciences apply different methods and conceptual schemes. They look at their different pieces under different aspects. Only a butcher who knows the animal can find the right joints. Hence the philosopher, as Plato demands, should be a good butcher. The butcher of man does not know man. Even if a perfect butcher could find the right joints, the pieces would not fit into one another, as divergent conceptual schemes took a hand in shaping the pieces. The scholars in charge of the pieces speak different languages, which the student of man cannot translate into one another. In despair he turns to philosophy for a universal grammar. But the professors of philosophy disagree on the alphabet.

Still man goes on being one.

Man, a compound of physical chemical events in the department of physiology, grows in the divinity school into a soul to be saved, and sinks in the department of psychology into a mechanism of stimuli and responses. The economist confronts his construct of pure theory with the reality of a changing economic life, and sees rational man upset the mechanism of the market by acting, even collectively, as a romantic fool. The anthropologist collects the material data of different cultures only to realize that the core of his problem is a "system of meanings." He tries to

classify and compare cultures. On what basis, if each culture is unique? The sociologist aims at the laws of social change. But his variables are at best the variables of a particular genus of society. They desert him as the society changes. He tries to classify in order to get at least at the variables of a class, but looks in vain for a principle of classification. Whatever age, country or culture the historian describes as unique, he will be suspected of describing it only in the light of his own age, which is equally unique. Yet he finds analogies between different ages and countries, and finally confesses that man, the eternally mutable being, is what he has always been and ever will be. But he does not say what man is and when at his best describes a particular time as an ephemeral manifestation of an eternal though unknown man.

The various sciences are eager to draw lines that demarcate areas in a system of sciences. These divides, however, merely divide professors. We learn that psychology deals with the individual qua individual, social psychology with the individual as a member of a group, sociology with groups. But it is as individual that man is a member of a group; as a member of a group that he is an individual. It is through individuals that groups behave. Yet areas of research must be differentiated. Certainly, if only the theories, the conceptual schemes developed in one area, did not forget that they must cover or be compatible with the phenomena of another area. The subject matter remains a unity. Conceptual schemes do not create the subject matter. They create aspects, a mirror, and the properties of the mirror share in shaping the image.

Biology, we learn, deals with nature; sociology with the social order. The one is supposed to stand still while the other moves. But biology and sociology speak different languages. Textbooks of sociology start with a description of human nature in terms of both biology and individual psychology, and proceed in another language to inquire into a social world that changes. But the laws of the social order are laws of nature. Biology does not

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exhaust nature. One nature embraces the changing and the changeless.

Man is not an aggregate of data to be set down side by side. Mere distinctions do not help; we must state how the "realms," "areas," "levels" we distinguish are related to one another. Whenever we absolutize any set of concepts used for one of these realms we stabilize a doubtful distinction, succumb to a master of our own making, deprive ourselves of any possibility of inquiring into these relations, and must finally acquiesce in the split between man and nature, mind and body, physical and mental experience.

We would do better to treat all our dividing lines and specific sets of concepts, those of biochemistry included, as merely preliminary results of tentative points of view. The question remains: what is man? Not only the answers differ. The little word "is" contained in the question itself has many senses. Yet man "is."

Social scientists never weary of discussing methodology—a sign of weakness, not of strength. Were they sure of their results, they would not quarrel over methods. The model of the "scientific method" is borrowed from the natural sciences and lives on their prestige. Its formulation is largely defective. Not a few fancy they could share in this prestige simply by accepting as "scientific" only facts that are "verifiable" by anybody, and by demanding that these facts be ordered and correlated in constant relations between measurable quantities.

The results of this method as applied by the social sciences are meager. Facts are amassed far beyond possible use. Some are not even facts; others are of dubious relevance. Correlations of data do not establish laws of social change. The variables chosen for the sake of easy and reliable verification are not universal, their relations not constant. We have not yet a system of variables whose claim to articulate the social reality is uncontested.

Does not the spirit of science demand that the subject matter determine the method? Does not the preconceived method circumscribe our interest, mutilate our capacity to observe, distort

the subject matter? Maybe the social scientist would better heed his own counsel.

In the social sciences the facts are not given as isolated items. When isolated, these items are no longer the "facts." Moreover, granting that facts must be verifiable, demands for a specific verification are bound to lead to a preference for, or a selection of, a particular sort of facts. But these may not be the pertinent ones. We may prefer the clearly to the obscurely given; we cannot preassume that the clearly given explain or hold the key to the obscurely given. We may cherish the hope but should not deem the assumption scientific. Empiricists must be impartial. Science does not demand that we exclude facts; it demands that we refine and enlarge our capacity to observe.

It is obvious that in social life even such facts or items as can be isolated, observed and measured by instruments are what they are by virtue of their roles, functions, meanings in a dynamic context, the context of life. This is not only the first of all facts; it is the criterion of relevance: things are relevant with respect to it.

Our procedure of isolating items contains a great many hidden preassumptions. Many "facts" are not raw material, but the product of an initial, though unconscious, process of prefabrication. Though we must isolate, the social sciences cannot start with the product of isolation. Their facts are given in a living context.

The specific difficulties of the social scientist culminate in the demand for an "objective" description, on the one hand, and the necessity to recognize the relevance of "subjective" factors, on the other. In this apparent contradiction "subjective" and "objective" are used in different senses. The demand for an objective description is directed against the subjective bias or deficiency of the observer and holds for all science.

The subjective factors, whose relevance is recognized, belong to the thing observed, not to the observer. This thing, in the social sciences, is man. Man, a "subject," deals with objects. Objects have uses, functions, meanings for subjects. Subjects have

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attitudes toward objects. If the sociologist distinguishes subjective from objective factors, he thinks of meanings, attitudes that belong to a subject matter in which the objective object cannot be separated from the subject whose object it is. Their "subjectivity" is the subject-character of the subject—the object to be observed—not the subjectivity of the observer. The ambiguous use of "subjective" and "objective" blurs two senses and feeds an endless confusion.

A scientist who, aiming at objectivity whatever the cost, excludes not merely his own subjectivity but also the subjective factors of his subject matter, deprives himself of the greater part of his facts, and his subject matter of its specific nature. He puts a ban on any kind of interpretation, restricts himself to registering "overt actions," and finally prefers the behavior of rats to that of the human soul, since the latter but not the former might suggest an interpretation that could be deemed subjective.

He may have good reasons and the best of excuses. The subjective factors, though they belong to the object observed, are phenomena for which verification and any check on the subjective bias or error of the observer are difficult. He can point to volumes of obvious misinterpretation, since the philosophers or other theorists of the human soul would rather press their theories into the phenomena than look at the phenomena and patiently read their tale.

However good such reasons and excuses may be, the awkward situation remains. Overt actions are what they "mean." Two objectively identical actions may mean, and thus be, two different things. All items of the material content of a culture may be reported "objectively"—the system of meanings remains the core of the problem.

Seemingly, the more reliable our observation, the less relevant our facts; the more relevant our facts, the less reliable our observation. What is *proteron pros hemas*—prior relatively to us—need not be *proteron physei*—prior by its nature.

While, guided by the practical problems the manipulation of

our own complex society poses, the science of society piles fact upon fact, inquires into trends, and establishes correlations, which, however useful, coordinate merely average values of ephemeral variables of our own society, social theory—aiming at a science of man—is not sure of the questions to ask, the concepts to apply, the language to use, the bearing of the answers it gets.

There is only one way: whether we are scientists or philosophers, we must refine and develop our capacity to observe, even if that takes us beyond the boundaries of easy verifiability by anybody. Unless we achieve an "objective" treatment of the "subjective" factors, we shall continue to move hither and yon between meaningless facts and doubtful meanings.

## II

Science aims at a system of permanences. In a world of change these permanences are assumed to be constant relations between variables, which as "laws" govern the change. But is social life not indefinitely mutable?

When looking at social life as it unfolds around the globe and through the ages we see societies grow and decay, cultures follow one another, groups within groups wrestle with the world, change their gods, their ways of life and the interpretations of their existence, more or less slowly or quickly, yet without rest or respite, amid some knowledge and much ignorance, much misery and some happiness. An enormous pageant reaches from a forgotten past into an unknown future through a confused present.

It seems to be a strange kind of drama. There is no audience. The actors are its sole observers. No actor, however, stays through the play from beginning to end. Even any hero drops out after hardly more than half a scene. Most of us are poor actors, playing merely ourselves. There are no rehearsals, no script. We do not even know our lines, though we have only one or two to speak. We must be satisfied if the two lines we improvise seem to make sense to ourselves or to our nearest co-actors for some time, or are worth being remembered.

It may not be a play at all; before it is enacted it may lack the unity of a plot or a meaning as a whole. If there is a meaning the actors provide it during the play. This seems to be part of their acting. Nevertheless, man likes to pose as a divine observer outside the play. The philosopher of history pretends that every scene is what it is by virtue of its role in the play as a whole—the “meaning” of the whole to be interpreted by the philosopher of history. An insolent animal usurps God’s throne. Such a philosophy of history, or any interpretation of the plot or meaning of the whole as expanded in space and time—even the philosopher’s need for such an interpretation, his insistence that there must be such a meaning which justifies the parts—may be but a more or less ephemeral line in the play. The philosopher of history shapes his interpretation of the plot to fit the lines that he wants to say.

Yet there are “laws,” invariants of history, a system of permanences. They are not, however, laws of any of the historical “worlds” that in time come to be and perish. They are rules that govern the acting of any possible actor in any possible play. They are to be searched for in the heart of the actor, and no interpretation of an historical cosmos can guide the search.

The philosopher of history will not find them in his imaginary meaning of the plot as a whole. Nor will a divine physicist find them in the mirror of his conceptual scheme. The physicist as observer would not even recognize himself in the description of himself as an object of his physics.

Each civilization, society, culture, builds up a “world,” an order of a whole in which man lives. As the society changes, this world changes. We no longer live in our grandfathers’ world. It seems to be our destiny as historical beings to move in a space that moves while we move. We try to escape this situation and stabilize our image of the world. The world should not move. We seek the system of permanences in the order of a stabilized cosmos. Yet this world changes, though we never intended it should. Again we try to escape and set up behind the changing

world the image of a wider world in which this change of our world is thought to occur. We do so of necessity: it is one of the rules that govern our acting.

Yet every such cosmic image, the wider as well as the narrower, is a product of time, shoved aside by time. So far as we interpret human existence in terms of such cosmic images, the changes of the world involve our interpretation of man.

The system of permanences is not to be found in any cosmic scheme. The permanences reside in the structure of the dynamic context in which these cosmic schemes come to be and perish. This context is not a whole of history extended in time. It is the context of life as life, in any possible world. Its laws are the rules that govern any actor in any possible play, as, in improvising his lines, he builds up an image of a world in which his lines make sense, and wrestles with the passions of his heart and the stubbornness of things.

There are countless variables. Any social or cultural change involves a multitude of transformations. These transformations pervade one another and interact in innumerable ways. Some are easy, others difficult, to verify. We cannot assume that their verifiability is a test of their relevance. The data that undergo transformation cannot be put side by side in a list of traits and properties. The variables belong to different groups and are of different orders. They have more or less bearing on the concrete life of the society we study. What is their order? Which are universal?

There is only one way to search for an answer. All life, be it the life of a hermit in the woods or of the chairman of the Middletown Women's Club, occurs as life in a dynamic context which, however general, has a definite structure. This dynamic context is omnipresent—implied in every fact, so far as it is a fact, of social life. Every question and every answer in a questionnaire presupposes it. The scheme of this context must contain in itself the principle of its differentiation, provide places for its variables, and thereby articulate its possible variations. If it does, it can

claim to constitute a theory. Without such a scheme, the science of man will never be a science.

### III

Sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists speak of the pattern of a society, of a culture, of life in a rural, urban, suburban community or in a primitive tribe. The term "pattern" is assumed to mean a kind of order that constitutes the unity of a system. These patterns change. What is the pattern of all patterns within which these changes occur?

There is open or tacit agreement on one answer to this question. Man and environment, linked to each other in such terms as "adjustment," "maladjustment," "effective" or "ineffective" relationship, are thought to constitute a system of variables and to serve as the "pattern of all patterns."

In speaking of a good or bad adjustment, an effective or ineffective relationship, we assume that man's relation to his environment moves between good and bad, effective and ineffective; we even imply a kind of vector, tendencies toward a better adjustment or a greater effectiveness, forces within the system that tend to change the system in a certain way. However meager, this scheme is meant to be universal.

Yet little has been done to articulate and enrich the scheme. It may be that whenever a human being of any kind faces an environment much more is universal and given. But even the inarticulate scheme poses a great number of embarrassing questions.

Its variables are of two kinds. Man and environment are presumed to be indefinitely variable. The term "adjustment" suggests a variability between 0 and 1. Expressed as a formula:  $M_n - \frac{1}{0} R - E_n$ . Different men can live in an equally effective relationship or an equally perfect adjustment to different environments, and thus be compared in terms of their adjustment. Actually this does not mean much, yet it implies a great deal. It contains a hint: the universal variables may be relations. Of

course, the different variables must be described independently of one another before we can trust any correlation we may be able to observe. But here we encounter another difficulty.

Since the correlations we are looking for presuppose an independent description of their relata, we treat man and his environment as different sets of items in the environment of the observer, to be identified by independent observations. This is, of course, perfectly legitimate and harmless whenever the observer and the human beings observed happen to live in the same environment. When we deal with an alien society and culture, the case is different. An anthropologist reports that the Andaman Islanders collect (empty) tin cans. He can be said to describe the life of the Andaman Islanders in terms of his own environment. But these are tin cans, "objectively"; they are manufactured in Philadelphia, as tin cans. Yes, but this kind of objectivity is irrelevant. They are what they are in the environment of the Andaman Islanders—rare, round, shiny objects—by virtue of the role they play in Andaman life. Thus the observer would do better to treat man and environment not as two separate sets of data but as the unity of a system whose inherent relations he should carefully respect.

"Environment" is obviously a relational term. An environment is someone's environment. Man is forever man in an environment. Both man and environment undergo change. Their changes change their relation to each other. This unity of a system can be said to be a dynamic context. It is full of tensions. So much everyone will be willing, or if not willing, can be compelled to grant.

I go a step further. The concrete reality of man and environment in relation to each other at any given moment is not merely what a man or his environment actually is or does here and now. It includes what a man or his environment can or could be or do, whether they actually are or do it. Our attitude toward other beings, human or not, depends both on what they actually are, here and now, and on what we think they could be and do. Thus



the "is" and "is not" have two senses, differentiated by the terms "actually" and "potentially."

In concrete life the reality of a being, human or not, includes its potentialities; they are part of the reality itself. I face an environment: I, as a being that is or does this, and can be or can do that, face an environment that is or does or yields this, but can or might be or do or yield that. Not only actualities but potentialities faced one another as the Pilgrim Fathers arrived in Plymouth Bay. The customary way of recognizing potentialities in the sciences dealing with man is to talk about "faculties," "capacities," "dispositions" of men or things.

Men differ from one another in their actualities and in the range of their potentialities. The same holds true for environments. Some environments have many answers for man's demands; others, such as the Arctic areas, have scarcely one. Man has no choice; getting a "No" to all except one question he may ask, he has to accept the one "Yes" and live an Eskimo's life.

Mere potentialities are not yet "tendencies" or "forces." Tendencies or forces presuppose potentialities. Man strives, desires, wants. He puts demands on his environment, meets desires and wants of other beings; the environment puts demands on him. Man and environment may or may not yield to their mutual demands. The man-environment system is full of tensions between different tendencies and forces. Their possible concords and discords are present in each other as possibilities of the system. Man, when miserable, is still a being that could be happy.

The pattern of all patterns implies tensions between "is," "can be," "tends to be," "should be." I use "should" here in the innocuous sense of a response to demands, without moral connotations. Man and his environment may or may not be what they could, tend to, or should, be. Sometimes they do not tend to be what they should be. We move forever to and fro between the possible concords and discords of "is," "can be," "wants to be," and "should be." Their tensions are our life.

The pattern of all patterns is a dynamic context: a "could"

and "should" inhere in the "is." "Facts" of an observer are what they are in their dynamic context. Isolation alters the "facts."

I return to the term environment. We have not yet faced the main difficulty. Environment must be someone's environment. A wood as such is not environment. It may be the environment of a hunter or a snake; it is not the same environment for the hunter as for the snake. Lots of things happen to the snake in his environment that do not and cannot happen to the hunter in his. Yet the environment is one and the same.

Psychologists distinguish between two meanings of the term "environment." The first is the geographical or physical; the second, the behavioral or functional. The difference seems obvious: the first is "absolute," the second, "relative."

The "absolute" environment could not be environment at all if it were no one's environment. And if it is someone's environment it is not absolute. The term can mean only that we regard the wood as the possible environment of an undefined multitude of possible beings. Only because there is such a thing that can become the environment of both a hunter and a snake can the hunter meet the snake.

The functional environment of the hunter does not become the functional environment of the snake. There is no common functional environment for the hunter and the snake. An I and You, able to talk with each other, can have a common functional environment—the functional environment of the group.

The geographer or the physicist pretends to describe the wood "objectively." By this he should mean merely that he describes it intersubjectively, without regard for any particular concrete observer but in relation to an anonymous observer whose data no possible observer can contest.

In the sciences dealing with man, environment means environment in relation to man. Here things are what they are in relation to man. Man, however, is concrete only as this or that man or group of men.

If an anthropologist describes the formation of an island in the

South Pacific, its plants, animals and the like, in terms of geography, botany, zoology, he does not describe the environment of the tribe, which is the subject matter of his studies. What he describes and calls the objective environment is the potential environment of any possible tribe.

From there the anthropologist proceeds to the functional environment of the tribe: the functions, uses, meanings, interpretations of the things in this geographical or physical environment. He describes or should describe the environment no longer relatively to the anonymous observer, but to the tribe itself. This is a different story. The functional environment can be both narrower and wider than the geographical or physical. An infinity of things that belong to the physical environment may be no part of the functional. Things that do not belong to the geographical or physical environment may play an important role in the functional environment: spirits in trees and rivers, and the souls of the dead. Though the functional and physical environment can be distinguished, they cannot be separated.

As man knows himself to be not man but this or that man, he does not conceive of an environment as being merely a functional environment; nor does he think of a functional environment as being merely his own. Any ego-centered psychology misses at its very outset the road to social life. We have only to look at what really happens. Though the human being may never be able to characterize or describe his environment except as functional environment, that is, in terms of uses, functions, meanings, direct or indirect, relatively to himself, he forever posits it and all the things in it as absolute, that is, as having a being of their own beyond any function or meaning to him. The environment is not a psychological or phenomenal "field" whose center the individual is assumed to be. Man may put himself into the center of a psychological field; he never is and need not think of himself as the center of his environment. The environment is and is thought to be both the actual and the potential environment of other beings.

Man, as this or that man, refers his functional environment not merely to himself. He refers it as well to other beings whose functional environment it is or could be or become. The hunter posits the wood as something that has a nature of its own, independent from him. Even before the snake he steps on chances to become an item of his functional environment, he thinks of the wood as the potential environment of other beings, known or unknown to him.

We should be very careful not to forget that the "functional" character of our environment implies two references: to ourselves, and to an "absolute" character by virtue of which our environment is the potential environment of other beings. Friends and foes are not merely items of their respective functional environments. They are beings who refer their functional environments to each other. Thus only can they be friends and foes.

Here the man-environment scheme comes up against its crucial test, and falters. It cannot serve as pattern of all patterns. It cannot articulate the social situation. Hence sociologists limit its usefulness to the personality research of an individual psychology. But the personality problems of individual psychology arise in social situations. The single ego is an abstraction.

#### IV

What is this generalized man of the man-environment scheme? We assume that "man" stands for every possible individual ego, whoever it may be. In this assumption we are wrong, though in thinking in terms of classes and members of classes we have the best conscience in being wrong.

No man is born with a capital M, but as this or that being, male or female, Chinese or American, of a mother to whom he was something ere he could be alone with himself. He is not born merely as a member of a class "man." Man with a capital M is not the generalized Ego. Every Ego is an I to a You within a We, and only as such can it be generalized and writ large. It could not harm even individual psychology never to forget that every

Ego, before being born, was an It; no one knew whether it would be a He or a She. It became first a He or a She, then a tentative Tu, and only as Tu an Ego. Indeed, it keeps on being a potential and actual Tu, He, or She, a member of a We, You, and They. Only as an Ego can it be all the others, and only as all the others can it be an Ego. Dying, it dies as an Ego and yet does whatever it can to outlive the Ego as a Tu, a He, or a She.

Individual psychology is a branch of social psychology by the nature of its subject matter. Though, in order of time, our social psychology developed as a branch of individual psychology, it still bears the imprint of its origin. In most of our talk about the "social field" the Ego still stands in the center of a psychological field. Like any other object in the field, the Alter Ego is referred to the Ego. This way of thinking, deeply ingrained in the habits of the psychologist, in the setting of his experiments, and in the questions he asks, seems to be, but is not, a matter of course. The child, though he refers the mother to himself, may perchance refer himself and some of his objects to the mother who enters his room. The social field is not the field of the Ego.

Thus we might do better to realize that the diverse entities in our environment are of two kinds: some are "objects" or things; others are "subjects" or living beings. In using these terms, however, we should remove the connotation they have in the theory of knowledge. Here the subject is the perceiver; the object, the perceived. Theory of knowledge asks: how does the subject come to perceive, to know, to think the object? There is only one subject, the perceiver; everything else, including the Alter Ego, is object. No one need, and psychology should not, yield to the pressure of a theory of knowledge that confronts a generalized subject with a generalized object of experience.

Some beings in our environment are subjects, though, to the theory of knowledge, they are merely objects, things perceived. What do or should we mean?

Subjects "live"; objects have no "life." We distinguish between organic and inorganic nature. These, however, are classifications

within the objective world of a scientific observer outside his world—or within an “absolute” or physical environment that is no one’s environment and therefore no environment at all.

If we remain within the dynamic context of man’s relation to his environment we find ourselves still using and needing the distinction, though in a different sense. What we distinguish are relations between a man and the beings of his environment. We treat one being as a subject, another being as an object. The distinction need not coincide with the distinction between living beings and dead things in an “objective” world or an “absolute” environment. We can treat living beings as if they were dead objects, and often do so. We can even treat, at least within certain limits and for a while, dead things as if they were living beings.

Here are a man and a stone. The stone is something to be thrown, to stumble over, to be used for a house. Whatever it may be, it is treated, described, characterized relatively to a living being. This living being may be ourself or our tribe or the lizard that hides under the stone, or the scientific observer or a fusion of all possible beings, to whom the stone could be whatever it may be. The stone is an object. Objects have a relative being. They are of use or of no use, good or bad, healthy or poisonous to somebody. They are what they are *pros allo ti*, with respect to something else, yet they are posited as having a nature of their own, and thus an absolute and not only a relative being, independent of what they are to any other being. This absoluteness concerns merely *that* they are—not our knowledge of *what* they are.

The stone needs another being who has the power to bestow on it a being relative to himself. This other being—by virtue of so strange a power—is a subject. A cow has the power to let grass be food. A lizard has the power to let a stone be a hiding place, in the functional environment of the lizard. The poor stone has no such power. It is an object. Subjects have a kind of being in themselves, *en heautois*; objects have a being only *pros allo ti*. The stone can be something to us; we can be nothing to the stone. This marks the difference.



Fortunately, a man's functional environment consists not merely of objects that can have only a being relatively to himself. He is not the sole being in his functional environment that has the power to bestow on things such a relative being. Some beings in his environment are subjects—living beings—some of them human and his kin; they, too, have the power to bestow on things, even on him, a being relative to themselves.

Here are a man and his dog. A man can be something to his dog, and care; he can be a master, friend, companion, foe. From his dog he receives at least a tiny part of what he is to himself. He even meets and recognizes in things the power of the dog to let things be something relative to itself. He may continue to refer the dog to himself. He begins to refer himself to the dog. This is the fundamental fact, from which social life starts, though it has escaped many a philosopher and the greater part of present-day psychology.

Man is bound to encounter the power of his fellowmen over things and himself. He may or may not acknowledge this power. He may even try, successfully or not, to treat another human being as an object, a tool, or slave. He may or may not learn that this or that other being resists being treated as an object. His slave may not compel him to listen to his demands. His children will, or his wife—and he need not even be compelled. He can enjoy discovering in himself a being relatively to others.

Referring the environment to himself, man refers himself to his environment. He returns the reference. "Environment" suggests a one-way reference. The double reference reveals the limitations of the term. To psychologists who start as a matter of course with the man-environment dichotomy, man with a capital M becomes an isolated ego that "responds" to the "stimuli" of an environment. But this environment contains subjects: beings in themselves, to which man is or can be something. The line between the ego and all other things is not the only demarcation line between man and his environment. There are many possible lines. The cave man may not draw the line between his ego and

the environment. His wife and children are not environment in the same sense as the stones and trees around his cave. He may draw the line between his family and the things around his cave. The I does not face merely the It. The I faces a You; the You is not an It. The I and You together face the It.

If we insisted on remaining within the man-environment scheme we would at least be compelled to go beyond the one-way sense in which we use it. It is not only that the environment is something in relation to man; man is what he is in relation to his environment as well as to himself. It is even true that what he is to his environment plays some role in whatever he is to himself.

By nature and of necessity man needs not only beings that he can treat as objects and refer to himself as food or shelter, as means of satisfying desires, or as instruments of procreation. He is in need of other beings—subjects—to which he can refer himself. The lonely man may even be inclined to treat an animal, a flower or a tree as subject, and "care" for it. He lets dead things take the place of the living beings he lacks and "objects" be "subjects." Man prefers man to animals and flowers. Man "responds."

In mutual response human beings bestow on one another a being relative to one another. What I am to You or to a We becomes part of what I am to myself. Even what the things are to You or to the group "in" which I live is part of what they are and can be to me.

## v

Whenever we take pains to inquire into the meaning of this little word "in," a host of awkward questions come to the fore. The man-environment dichotomy seems to set up man against his environment. Man "faces" his environment. We may ask where this "facing" occurs, and answer, indignant at so silly a question, that it occurs in the "objective" world. Quite frequently, however, this objective world turns out to be the functional environment of the observer. It should be at least the environment of

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the generalized observer of science, whom I call the anonymous observer. But the awkward question remains.

The Andaman Islander faces his tin cans neither in the functional environment of an American observer, to whom tin cans are defined by their use, nor in the "objective" world of an anonymous scientific observer, to whom tin cans are defined in terms of physics and chemistry, but in his own, the Andaman Islander's world, in which tin cans may have a kind of magic power. As the behavior of the Andaman Islander toward tin cans or other items of his environment depends upon the structure of the world "in" which he lives, we cannot disregard this world of his and treat the man and his environment as different and separate sets of items in the environment of a particular or a generalized observer. They constitute a system—together. This system is the legitimate subject matter of an observer, whose first obligation is to the nature of his subject matter. Things are what they are within this system. If we split them into two separate sets of items we destroy the relations in which the relata are what they are.

It may be doubted that this system of which man is a part should be called environment. The term is misleading. Man is not a part of his environment. He is well or badly adjusted, in an effective or ineffective relationship to it. We need a term that stresses not "against" but "in"—a small word, yet the most difficult in social theory.

Sociologists and psychologists recognize this need, and they resort to such terms as "atmosphere," "mental climate," "mental space," "life space"; or they borrow from physics the term "field." Each has some descriptive value. Following the lead of the word "in," we may say, using an ancient but now forgotten distinction, that man as subject is "in himself"—*en heauto*—though as a finite being among other beings he is in something else—*en allo*—which is not himself though it embraces him as a part. This all-embracing thing is the unity of an order as a whole. Whatever it may be or may be thought to be, it is unity of an order pervading

both man and all the things of his environment. It is not an aggregate, the sum total of all the things in the environment plus one—man. It is this unity of an order that we call “world”; man and his environment are in the same “world.” The world in which they are is man’s world.

But the term “world,” used in many different senses in scientific, religious, metaphorical language, is hardly less ambiguous than “environment.” Moreover, it suggests problems of a philosophical nature which the term environment conveniently hides. The scientist shuns philosophy; he readily scorns it, except the rather anaemic one he need not be aware of, which is implied in the preassumptions of his “scientific method.” For shunning philosophical implications he pays an enormous price in the emptiness of such terms as “adjustment” or “effective relationship to the forces of the environment,” or of such definitions of culture as “the sum total of man’s conditioned responses to his environment.”

The advantage of the term “world” is that it exposes the ambiguities “environment” hides.

Since the rise of Gestalt psychology, psychologists can be supposed to be familiar with the logical distinction between a whole and an aggregate. The aggregate is a “many,” a multitude of elements. It can be complete: no element belonging to it is lacking. It can be incomplete: one or some elements are lacking. A complete aggregate is not yet a whole. The multitude of all existing elephants, though no elephant is lacking, is not a whole. Whenever “world” is thought of as *omnitudo rerum*, the totality of all things (meaning completeness), it is thought of as an aggregate.

“Whole” means a unity. Unity does not mean uniformity. It can be a diversity. But the diversity is not a composite of elements that are prior to the unity. It is the unity of a structure. So far as the whole has parts, every part submits to and contains this structure. The whole, as the unity of a structure, not as completeness of all parts, is present in every part.

The distinction between whole and aggregate, though difficult, is necessary. Man's behavior toward whatever we call his environment cannot be understood as the sum of his behavior to the sum of the things that constitute the environment as an aggregate. Man behaves toward the whole in which he thinks he lives as well as toward single things. Man's relation to this whole and his conception of its structure permeates his relations to single things; it not only orders his actual but predetermines his potential experience.

There is always a preformed scheme—preliminary or hypothetical, explicit or implicit, having some structure, however faint—which provides a possible place for what an item is or can be, and guides its interpretation. Without such a scheme, no experience would be or could ever become experience. We do not simply meet and collect items; we locate and identify them, and say what they are by referring them to the unity of an order that encompasses both ourselves and our environment. Man facing the environment presupposes that man and environment are "in" the unity of a world.

The ambiguities of the term world correspond to the ambiguities of the term environment. As the environment of the man-environment scheme is the functional, not the geographical environment, so the world in which we think we live is our "subjective" world, not the objective world of a scientific observer outside the world. As our functional environment is not merely ours but includes the reference to a potential environment of other beings, so is our subjective world not merely subjective but referred to an objective world, which we posit as absolute but qualify relatively to us. Our world is not the world; the world is not ours. We call our valley, our village, our country "our world," though we know it is not the world. We may call the universe of the astronomer, the stars and spiral nebulae, the world, though it is not "our" world. It is not the world in which we live, care and act.

We say my world, his world, "the" world—meaning *le monde*,

fashionable society—the diplomatic world, the gothic or baroque world, Goethe's or Shakespeare's world, the Greek or the Christian world, or everyone's world, our common world, world as the universe of all possible worlds. In all cases we have in mind a kind of whole "in" which the being whose world it is constitutes a part.

This whole in which we live is both a *mundus hominum*, the "group," and a *mundus rerum*, the world of things interpreted by the group, the one referred to the other. According to an ancient definition of space, but by no means the worst one, space, embraced by us, embraces us. Whenever we feel something like that double embrace of an order "in" which we are, we call it our world, and may mean our Bostonian society, our Massachusetts Bay, or our intellectual climate, or all three together as a unity. We feel pretty well "adjusted" to our environment whenever we can say "our world" and mean all three together—though we may not say it unless certain conditions are fulfilled concerning our relations to single things and to other human beings, the ones with respect to the others, and both with respect to this "world." Such expressions as "perfect adjustment" or "effective relationship to the forces of the environment" can be said to constitute a universal answer, cautious enough to pass as "scientific," to the old philosophical question of the "happy life"—a legitimate question and an empty answer.

The few distinctions, introduced here in the course, and for the purpose of a critical analysis of the man-environment scheme, may be used to articulate "perfect adjustment" or "effective relationship" in terms of mere relations between the constituents of a universal pattern, and may thus give the legitimate question an answer still universal and not quite so empty.

## VI

The few distinctions I propose may be found helpful in articulating the psychological content of some general concepts used in sociology, whose lack of precision is admitted and deplored: in-

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tegration, disintegration, growth and decay. Their further development may finally help to give such famous questions as the reasons for the lower suicide rate of Catholic populations a more accurate and specific answer than Durkheim's greater "social cohesion" which supports man in the "anxieties"—the maid of all work in modern psychology—of which suicide rates are said to be functions. The proposed distinctions may be useful for liberating social psychology from the pressure of an ego-oriented individual psychology. A certain though still modest enrichment of the man-environment scheme may provide the inquirer with some principles of possible differentiations and some tools for ordering the variations.

A mere revision of the man-environment dichotomy is not the suggestion to which this study is intended to lead. Much more is needed than to replace that scheme by another, more elaborate one. The man-environment scheme, however enriched, can hardly lose its fundamental ambiguity. It interrelates items in the environment of the observer which, as given relata, antecede their relations. This study suggests that the "fundamental pattern" the sciences of man are in want of should be conceived of as a dynamic context, implied in every fact of human life, individual or social, of whatever age and society. That dynamic context should not interrelate already given facts, but should articulate the variable interrelation of possible roles or functions of possible facts. This suggestion goes far beyond any mere enrichment of the man-environment scheme. It sets a difficult task. It merely points in a direction; in this direction alone can we hope to find the way to the "universal variables."

Many a scientist will scorn a request to resort to what he calls arbitrary metaphysics or the empty void of philosophical speculation. He is requested to do nothing of the sort, even if along this way he should stumble upon some of the oldest and most stubborn problems of philosophy proper.

His task presupposes that he distrusts not merely any philosophy not his own, but his own as well, however conveniently hidden.

It may demand that he refrain from absolutizing, as the reality of nature herself, the picture of human nature reflected in the conceptual mirror of biology and physiology. He is not required to shove the picture aside; he must accept the fact that in this particular conceptual mirror, in this particular light, his subject matter shows this particular order—an astonishing fact, to be wondered at no end. He must remain aware that, whatever order he himself assumes or discovers in his own mirror, this astonishing fact remains to be accounted for, as an aspect of the same yet unknown order in another conceptual mirror. But such acceptance does not compel him to submit to physiology and to “explain” emotions in terms of chemistry as a disturbance of glandular equilibrium.

The search for such a dynamic context may demand further that he resist the temptation to restrict his subject matter, under the excuse of a heuristic principle, to a certain type of order he would like to find. The scientific spirit by no means requires that the hidden nature of the subject matter correspond to a specific order which our practical interest in reliable predictions or in certain procedures of organized research would prefer.

This does not mean that the scientist should turn from observation to philosophical speculation. He may go on distrusting a philosophy in which he sees nothing but a body of traditional quarrels, perpetuated in changing terminologies by the professors of philosophy. It means only that he should patiently observe the phenomena as they are given in concrete life, and know what he does when he presses them into a mill in which, minced to facts, severed from their context, sifted according to verifiability, cumulated and correlated, they can no longer either tell the story of man's happy and miserable life or lead to laws of social change that social change cannot change.

Any such conceptual scheme of a “universal pattern” is not to be deduced from a preconceived metaphysical system and imposed upon the interpretation of the phenomena. It can only be an hypothesis and, like any hypothesis, a point of departure. It

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is to be corrected and refined, confirmed or rejected with respect to the power it may have or lack to order the diversity and to spell the concreteness of life. An analysis of the phenomenon in its living context, guided by the hunger for concreteness, and going many times to and fro from the most general to the most particular, may have some chance to order the variables in tentative groups of transformation, and finally to arrive, in many experiments of both thought and observation, at a working hypothesis of a system of universal variables that can outlive the change of material data, social institutions, and even of those cosmic images in which restless man interprets and reinterprets his own existence.

## BOOK REVIEWS

MOSAK, JACOB L. *General-Equilibrium Theory in International Trade*. Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press. 1944. xiii & 187 pp.

Modern economic theory has developed in three directions. There is first the already classical Walrasian approach, which analyzes the economic system by describing the behavior of each consuming individual and each producing unit by separate equations (which can therefore number in millions), collecting these equations in a few manageable sets, and working out the conditions under which equilibrium, in the short run or in the long run, can be obtained and maintained. This "microeconomic" approach is most rigorous, but it has proved extremely difficult to relate the results obtained to the observable facts of economic reality and to explain the actual happenings of economic life in terms of this equilibrium theory.

The second is the so-called "macroeconomic" approach, which was developed first in the work of Keynes, and, with a smaller scope, by Frisch. It has to sacrifice much of the rigor of the classical or Walrasian approach in its attempt to reach more fruitful results. It works with such difficult concepts as "total" employment, "aggregate" supply conditions for goods "in general," propensity to consume of the community "as a whole," which can be defined only in an approximate way with the help of index numbers. To some extent its concepts are susceptible of empirical-statistical determination, and its results have therefore proved extremely useful for economic policy, although they are easily open to misunderstanding.

The third approach has tried to overcome the difficulties of the Walrasian method by introducing far-reaching simplifications. In the theory of oligopoly, for example, it makes simplified assumptions about the form of the demand curves and the mutual response of competing oligopolists to price undercutting. In the theory of foreign trade such simplifications had already been introduced by Marshall; and the hypothesis of two countries, each of which produces and exports only one commodity, has become the standard assumption of modern foreign trade theory.

Such a simplified approach imposes particular limitations on the theory of foreign trade, and these Dr. Mosak attempts to overcome by extending to the problems of international trade the rigorous analysis of the first type. He proceeds by first presenting, in a systematic fashion, the modern microeconomic theory, as developed primarily by J. H. Hicks. This part of his book will prove of enormous value

to economic theorists, who have hitherto had to gather the mathematical framework of Hicks' theory from the scattered notes in the mathematical appendix to *Value and Capital*. In addition, Dr. Mosak has in various important respects amplified the material prepared by Hicks. The reader who is interested in the technical development of the new theory is referred in particular to Dr. Mosak's proof (p. 42) that, contrary to Hicks, the stability of the exchange equilibrium cannot be destroyed by any possible degree of complementarity; to his introduction of the concept of inverse complementarity (p. 46); and to his interesting though, in the reviewer's opinion, not yet completely clarified concept of "equilibrium unemployment" (p. 154), which is deduced for a dynamic system in which there is a so-called unit elasticity of price expectations, that is, a state in which a change in prices induces the buyers to expect a proportionate change in future prices.

This presentation of the modern microeconomic approach, both to static equilibrium and to intertemporal equilibrium, fills the larger part of the book. Along with the elegant and rigorous discussion of the "terms of trade" and the size and direction of the money flow in the special case of two commodities and two countries, the chapters pertaining to the theory of a closed economy would, alone, make the book one of the most remarkable theoretical publications of recent years. In addition, it can be said that Dr. Mosak's rigorous approach to the problems of international trade has led us closer to the goal of explaining economic reality in terms of concepts susceptible of empirical quantitative measurement.

In his discussion of "Equilibrium of Exchange in an International Economy" (Chapter 3) the author had first to indicate the modifications that must be made in the general equation system developed for a closed economy if it is applied internationally, especially if unilateral payments (such as reparations) are introduced. The significance of his approach becomes clear in his discussion of the "Effects of 'Impediments' to Trade," briefly, the effects of import taxes and export taxes on prices. Definite results are obtained for the cases in which the government spends the tax proceeds on one single commodity or on the taxed commodities. These results depend largely on the elasticity of the import demand for the commodities concerned, and since the attempts to measure quantitatively the elasticity of demand with respect to price have made great progress during recent years, we find ourselves much closer than before to the practical applicability of international trade theory. It may be hoped that also for the more

general cases—in which the government spends the tax proceeds on all commodities or redistributes the proceeds of the tax (Chapter 3, Section iv, C and D)—sufficiently specific results will be obtained in the future.

In the same way Dr. Mosak was able, in his discussion of "The General Equilibrium of Production in International Trade," to reach specific conclusions regarding the particular instances in which the income elasticity for either domestic commodities or international commodities is zero (in other words, the quantity of such commodities in demand does not change if income changes), and the instances in which that elasticity happens to be the same in the country making unilateral payments and in the country receiving unilateral payments. For the more general case, in which the unilateral payments directly change the aggregate demand for every product, the result again depends in a complicated way on the elasticities of demand with respect to income, and thus on magnitudes that are susceptible of measurement.

In Dr. Mosak's words: "In the 'normal case' when domestic products are noninferior, and they are closer substitutes for export than for import products, the domestic product prices of the receiving country will rise relative to those of the paying country unless the reparations lead to a sufficiently large direct increase in the aggregate demand for the paying country's exports relative to those of the receiving country. On the other hand, the commodity terms of trade may turn against the paying country even when the aggregate demand for its exports directly increases, if the demand for the receiving country's domestic products rises sufficiently in comparison with the paying country's demand for domestic goods, and the export products in each country are sufficiently closer substitutes for domestic goods than are import goods" (pp. 108-09).

The last chapter, on "Market Equilibrium in an International Economy," proceeds, if the reviewer is not mistaken, on macro-economic lines rather than in the direction of extending the analytical apparatus developed in the preceding chapters. Into a relatively short space there is here compressed an analysis which usually fills books about the "foreign trade multiplier."

Apart from this chapter, it may be said that Dr. Mosak has given us everything that can be obtained from purely qualitative analysis on rigorous lines. On the firm basis he has laid in his book, quantitative studies will be able in the future to make fully understandable the complex effects that international trade and international capital

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movements have exercised during the last few decades on the economic wellbeing of nations. The question whether the neoclassical micro-economic approach is superior to, or even as fruitful as, the macro-economic approach is, however, not yet decided.

HANS NEISSER

MISES, LUDWIG VON. *Omnipotent Government. The Rise of the Total State and Total War.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1944. ix & 291 pp. \$3.75.

The present book by this prominent Austrian economist is a political essay which excels in the qualities that the reader may expect of its author. As the title suggests, it is another forceful statement of the anti-interventionist thesis which Professor von Mises has maintained in his previous writings. The attack is again directed against "étatisme" in all its forms and in all degrees, from the types exemplified by Communist Russia and National Socialist Germany to the interventionist policies of democratic governments intent on preserving or restoring the foundations of a free society. In this essay, however, the author's main concern is the international aspect of étatisme. In fact, the book is essentially a treatise on nationalism, or more precisely, on German nationalism. About half the text, or more, is devoted to a discussion of the roots and the character of German nationalism in general and the ascendance of Nazism in particular. Professor von Mises' pointed reasoning, as well as the historical knowledge on which he is able to draw, recommends the book to the serious attention of students of present-day politics.

That it is the book of a dissenter ought to be an additional inducement to read it. We prove our true openmindedness not so much by benevolent toleration of the expression of opinions opposed to the current trend of thought and feeling as by a sincere readiness to weigh their content carefully. To be sure, an economic policy of outright laissez faire, as advocated by von Mises, is out of the question in the actual circumstances that confront us. But the fact that the laissez faire doctrine has but limited applicability to the pressing needs of our time does not invalidate all elements of the liberal philosophy. We shall do well to remember, for example, the warning of the nineteenth century liberals against the implications and consequences, both for domestic and for international politics, of expanding state functions even at a moment when such extension appears unavoidable, perhaps particularly at such a moment. Nor can we afford to neglect the liberal teachings on the merits of a competitive

order even, or particularly, when such an order can no longer be preserved by liberal methods proper. In these and many other respects the old-time liberals merely stressed, and often overstressed, considerations which no social theory or system whatever may completely disregard with impunity.

Professor von Mises therefore deserves our gratitude in so far as he recalls to us those elements of the liberal philosophy which have retained their validity beyond the era of Manchesterism. But it is unfortunate that he himself does not distinguish between the essential and the accidental principles of liberalism. John Stuart Mill, in his *Representative Government*, introduced a discussion of the criterion of a good form of government by the dictum that "the proper functions of a government are not a fixed thing, but different in different states of society." Similarly today Friedrich A. Hayek, Professor von Mises' own disciple, recognizes the varying scope of legitimate governmental functions. His *The Road to Serfdom* is a condemnation of the doctrinaire insistence "on certain rough rules of thumb, above all the principle of laissez faire." The main concern of the liberal, Hayek holds, should be rather the maintenance or restoration of "a system within which competition will work as beneficially as possible." But in von Mises' present book we seek in vain for a like qualification of the Manchester doctrine. This uncompromising attitude may easily defeat the author's purpose by discrediting liberalism as a still practicable theory of government.

The principle of laissez faire, or rather its violation by government interference of any kind with a free market economy and worldwide free trade, is the vehicle also of von Mises' theory of nationalism. He defends capitalism against the charge of having been the root of war, and attacks the belief that socialism means peace. Despite oversimplifications in the development of the argument, von Mises' criticism is fundamentally sound and is needed as an antidote against some current illusions. In view of the fact that the early history of socialism seems to lend support to the identification of peace and socialism, the refutation of that identification is particularly appropriate. Also, there can be no doubt that the author's skepticism concerning the possibility of coordinating interventionist policies of all or many governments is fully justified.

But it is an entirely different thing to maintain, as von Mises does, that nationalism and war are exclusively attributable to étatist deviations from the principle of laissez faire. As a matter of fact, his explanation of nationalism is basically very close to the views

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held by those schools of thought against which he otherwise engages in violent polemics. To be sure, socialists and interventionists on the one side, and von Mises on the other side, offer solutions of the economic and social problems of our time which are strictly opposite to one another. But they agree on the purely economic roots of nationalism and war, and accordingly overstress purely economic remedies. In this sense von Mises' essay impressively testifies to the descent of liberalism and socialism from closely related philosophies.

The inadequacy of the economic interpretation of nationalism is most conspicuous in von Mises' exposition of Nazism. He rightly refuses to base his explanation of Nazism on the German national character; in fact, on grounds of principle he disposes of the concept of national character as a fallacy. But the interpretation of Nazism in terms of German *Sozialpolitik* and German protectionism equally fails to satisfy the reader who distrusts a simple answer to a complex question.

ERICH HULA

LAIDLER, HARRY W. *Social-Economic Movements*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 1944. xx & 828 pp., index 54 pp. \$5.

In this volume Dr. Laidler has given us a monumental work, an encyclopaedia of all social-economic reforms and reformers, which takes its place at once as an indispensable textbook and reference book. And not only for schools and colleges. Any student of world happenings today, any journalist who wishes to be fully informed as to the underlying causes of the tremendous revolution we are witnessing in Europe, must have this on his desk. Nor is it merely a pedagogic listing of these movements, beginning with the social prophets and Plato's Republic. The book teems with compact sketches of the men who founded, or led, or still lead these searches for a better social and economic society. It is amazingly comprehensive, besides being strikingly objective in tone. Dr. Laidler has plainly achieved his aim of producing a compendium which lists practically all the radical movements in this field, yet does so in a manner which must disarm the narrowest and most reactionary school boards. They may object to their wards studying such subjects, but they can bring no charge of propaganda against the author.

That this is no small achievement for one who has given his life to furthering the Socialist cause is obvious. Moreover, Dr. Laidler has not hesitated to list the faults in the causes which he describes, and to record the points made against them. He has aimed to be

the historian and the portrayer, and has succeeded remarkably well. I have seen this book criticized because it does not seek to mold the opinions of youth, does not create lanes of thought through which young readers should unsuspectingly drift and nibble until, behold, they have suddenly arrived at a point where they can make lasting, vital and "correct" decisions as to the movements now threatening to overwhelm capitalist democracy everywhere. But this, to my mind, misconceives the whole purpose of this *vade mecum*, which, I take it, is to present the pastures and let those who enter them browse and digest for themselves. This is exposition and not a search for converts; and there, to this reviewer, lies its greatest merit. To which must be added that the style is so excellent and flows so freely that it has none of the austerity or the cataloguing of the mere pedant, which often frighten away many from volumes so large and comprehensive.

Undoubtedly, since there were so many subjects to cover, all over the world, there will be those who will regret that Dr. Laidler has not included one cause or another, such, for example, as birth control, or will refer to his not giving more space to the many American experiments in communism, such as the Oneida Community, or the remarkable Amana Community in Iowa, which carried on so true to its doctrines until the first World War came to interfere; both communities persist. Still others may complain that Dr. Laidler did not give more space to the revolutions of 1848 than the little more than three pages he has devoted to them, if only because their failure to achieve republican governments in Germany most gravely affected the whole subsequent history of Europe down to the present day. But it is hardly necessary to point out that there were obviously limits to the space which Dr. Laidler could properly fill without making a too formidable volume.

It is natural that Dr. Laidler should give a great deal of attention to Karl Marx and Marxism, because of the enormous role played by Marx and his doctrines, and because of his own special interest in the subject. He rightly quotes that conservative professor of economics, E. R. A. Seligman, as saying of Marx that "perhaps with the exception of Ricardo, there has been no more original, no more powerful, and no more acute intellect in the entire history of economic science." At that, Dr. Laidler devotes less than 48 pages to the discussion of Marx himself, his teachings, and the development of the whole movement. I like particularly Dr. Laidler's later discussion of Edward Bernstein and Revisionism, and the chapter he

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devotes to the Marxists' reply to the revisionists, an admirable example of condensation while doing complete justice to both sides. The brief history that Dr. Laidler has written of the Bolshevik revolution, and the subsequent developments of the Russian communist movement, covers the subject thoroughly for all save a specialized student, and is brought right down to date. The same is true of his recording of the development of the British Labour party, while the various worldwide cooperative movements are likewise adequately set forth.

Finally, it must be added that the book is admirably printed, and is equipped with an unusually good index and many pages of selected references, grouped for each chapter. It is also excellently illustrated. As Dr. Laidler points out, the first portion of this book appeared originally in his *A History of Socialist Thought*, now out of print.

OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

New York City

CASSIRER, ERNST. *Rousseau-Kant-Goethe. Two Essays.* [Translated from the German by James Gutmann, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall, Jr.: The History of Ideas Series, I.] Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1945. x & 98 pp. \$1.50.

This little volume contains two essays, "Kant and Rousseau" and "Goethe and the Kantian Philosophy," by a famous philosopher and scholar who died while preparing their publication. In the preface it is stated that in the present work the author tried "to illustrate from various perspectives the culture of the eighteenth century and the 'climate of opinion' . . . from which this culture arose." There is also a suggestion that the essays may serve as an introduction to the forthcoming English edition of the author's *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*.

The first study attempts to interpret the influence exerted on Kant by Rousseau's writings. After a general characterization of the two philosophers and of Kant's relation to Rousseau, the author singles out four problems for special discussion: human nature, the state and the law, optimism, and natural religion. Links between specific ideas in the two men's writings have been pointed out before. Cassirer himself called attention to them in his biography of Kant (1918), and Vorländer discussed them in a series of articles at about the same time (in *Die Neue Zeit*, vol. 37, pt. 1, 1918-19). Cassirer's new work is distinguished by his subtle analysis of the process of transformation by which Kant assimilated Rousseau's conceptions in his systematic



thought. In this respect the author seems to have been especially fortunate in the chapter on human nature.

To explain Kant's high admiration for Rousseau, Cassirer deems it necessary to attack the traditional conception of Rousseau as a mere sentimentalist and an antirationalistic apostle of the "omnipotence of the heart." One of the major achievements of this essay is that it shows the high rank which Rousseau accorded to reason in a number of his works. Even in the *New Heloise* there are passages that praise the rulership of reason over the passions of the heart. It is easy to imagine that such utterances appealed to Kant, who was not blind, however, to the other side of Rousseau and was attracted in particular by Rousseau's keen sense of freedom and independence. From Rousseau he learned the lesson of enthusiasm, without which "never has anything great been accomplished in this world." Traces of Rousseau's influence are noticeable even in the formulations of the categorical imperative.

Occasionally the author expresses the opinion that only the method of the history of ideas enables us to appraise Kant's debt to a thinker whose character was so opposite to his own "manner of 'existence.'" Such a remark reveals wherein lies the emphasis of Cassirer's interpretation but does not describe it adequately. Cassirer knows that Kant was indebted to Rousseau for more than new philosophical insights. In an analysis of Kant's famous remark, "Rousseau set me right," Cassirer explains that Kant felt himself challenged by Rousseau to an "intellectual and moral decision," and that it was because of this that "Kant's attitude toward the world and toward man" began to change. From a different point of view one might ask whether this crisis in Kant's development was not primarily connected with his truer understanding of his own self and hence indicative of an "existential" relation to him who had caused this new understanding. Of course, Kant's gratitude to Rousseau may or may not have revealed to him the true source of Rousseau's philosophical "existence." The question arises, however, whether, beyond the revision of the picture of Rousseau the thinker, there is not also a need for a new examination of Rousseau the man.

Whereas the first essay deals with the formation of the Kantian philosophy, the second has to do with its effects. About forty years ago Georg Simmel tried to point out the fundamental difference of *Weltanschauung* between Kant and Goethe, even on points where they apparently agreed. Cassirer sticks mainly to the interpretation of Goethe's own utterances on the Kantian philosophy. Goethe's

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positive interest in that philosophy dated from his reading of the *Critique of Judgment*, especially that part which deals with "teleological judgment." In a masterpiece of historical analysis Cassirer shows the affinity of Kant's and Goethe's efforts to introduce the genetic point of view into scientific thinking. Sharing Kant's contempt for dogmatic metaphysics, Goethe also assimilated important thoughts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* into his own ideas, and came to realize more and more the unique historical relevance of the Kantian philosophy for his epoch and for his own development. Cassirer does not mention such aspects of Goethe's relation to Kant as his violent repudiation of the Kantian concept of "radical evil." In both these essays the emphasis lies on the historical continuity of thought.

ERNST MORITZ MANASSE

*North Carolina College for Negroes*

LIPTZIN, SOLOMON. *Germany's Stepchildren*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America. 1944. xii & 298 pp. \$3.

Professor Liptzin is the author of several outstanding studies of modern German literature, among them a monograph on Richard Beer-Hofmann. In the present volume he attempts to analyze the "tragic duality" of being a German and a Jew, as reflected in the lives and writings of German writers of Jewish origin. The treatise deals with men like Börne and Heine, Hess and Herzl, Rathenau and Landauer, Wassermann, Stefan Zweig and Werfel, Schnitzler and Beer-Hofmann, Buber and Erich Kahler, and presents not only brief biographical accounts but also generous quotations which afford the reader an opportunity to form his own judgment. The author is to be commended for recording the views also of less known writers, especially those of the first half of the nineteenth century, such as Karl Bäck, Joel Jacoby (Franz Carl Jacoby) and David Friedrich Koreff. He deserves praise also for his mastery of the art of lucid description. The essays are stimulating throughout, and they are certain to induce many complacent readers to think seriously about the problems under discussion.

It may be worth while, however, to mention a few points of disagreement. First, the overall picture is somewhat distorted. The reader is left with the impression that most of these poets and essayists were beset by an insufferable tension and a feeling of ever-impending catastrophe. This onesidedness could have been avoided. Karl Wolfskehl's or Ludwig Strauss' wholehearted acceptance of the year 1933 as the challenge and trial should be perceived as a counter-

poise to the failures of Ernst Toller and Stefan Zweig. Also, there was Franz Rosenzweig, whose radical theological doctrine led to a sharp criticism of emancipation. His doctrine, though little noted so far, should not have escaped the author's attention.

In addition, it is to be deplored that the author chose to discuss only a very small number of scholars. The scholars, after all, were as legitimate spokesmen of their generation as were the men of letters. The necessity for an extensive discussion of Berthold Auerbach, who is not too relevant to the author's issue, or of "tolerant passivism," as reflected in Schnitzler's heroes, is questionable. And on the other hand, study of the problem is inadequate without discussion of the ideas of the historian Graetz, the theologians Abraham Geiger and Leo Bäck, and especially of Hermann Cohen, whose articles on "Deutschtum und Judentum" are classical treatises on the subject. By the same token the presentation of Buber's views is incomplete without an account of his polemics with Cohen (*Völker, Staaten und Zion*, 1917) and with G. Kittel (*Theologische Blätter*, 1933), and of his interconfessional efforts, which found expression for example in the periodical *Die Kreatur*.

Again, we would have been grateful to the author, who is well qualified for this task, for a thorough discussion of what modern European culture meant to the emancipated Jew. It was certainly more than "gaudy robes of occidental fabric," just as Judaism, to the loyal Jew, was more than "ancestral wrappings" (p. 285). Heine, too, saw the goal of European culture as a "final synthesis of Hellenism and Hebraism" (p. 217), with Hebraism understood as including Christianity. But this is too superficial a definition, and it does not further understanding of the force and the challenge of that civilization. It obscures the problems arising out of the impact of Europeanism upon a newly emancipated group. As a result, assimilation appears, necessarily, only in its negative aspects, and the reader will not escape a feeling of indignation about "Jewish Aryans" and "marginal Jews" (Chs. 12-13). It is doubtful that this was the author's intention. Also, he should have made it clear that the issues involved in transition from mediaevalism to modernity, and likewise the issues involved in reaction (such as anti-Semitism), while they were certainly accentuated in Germany, did not constitute a purely Jewish or a purely German problem. These are problems of western civilization, which cannot be evaluated from the point of view of the horrors of contemporary Germany.

Finally, while the book is rich in pointed characterizations, which

add much to its readability, the correctness of some of them may be open to question. It is doubtful, for example, whether Gabriel Riesser can be referred to as a "religious leader" (p. 42); or Otto Weininger as "Jewish High Priest of anti-Semitism" (p. 213); or Landauer as "German internationalist and Jewish nationalist" (p. 229); or Buber's Zionism as a "mixture of logical reasoning and nebulous mysticism" (p. 256).

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LIEPMANN, KATE K. *The Journey to Work*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1944. xii & 199 pp. \$3.50.

BURTON, H. M. *The Education of the Countryman*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1944. xi & 251 pp. \$3.50.

DENT, H. C. *Education in Transition*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1944. xi & 244 pp. \$3.

These three volumes are part of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, edited by Karl Mannheim. The book by Kate Liepmann is a conventional, albeit interesting, study of the social and economic problems of the commuter and his community, and the other two volumes, written by educators, deal with education in its social setting.

The first study classifies commuter communities into four types, documents their failure to solve many of the problems their proponents expected them to solve, and offers remedial suggestions, with discussion of the implications for town planning. Alone of the three volumes it makes considerable use of international comparisons. It is based on extensive data, gathered not only from some thousands of employees in half a dozen large English industries, and from other English sources, but also from studies in and censuses of Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and the United States. The problems of industrial society are sufficiently similar in the western world that the volume has definite value for urban sociologists and city and town planners in the Americas. There is an admirably clear and succinct four-page conclusion.

The American rural sociologist and rural educator will read the earlier portions of Mr. Burton's book with sympathy. In its larger outlines his diagnosis, though based almost entirely on English experience, would fit the American scene. Farming is the fourth largest occupation in England, only slightly smaller than the leaders. Over one-third of England's population is rural, as is a still larger propor-

tion of the school children. Moreover, these proportions are increasing: between 1927 and 1937 the urban school population declined 9.5 percent, the rural only 4.6 percent. In the present volume, however, the sociological significance of this fact is not sufficiently explored. Mr. Burton maintains, and rightly, that England's inability to tackle the rural problem as a whole has caused most of her problems of rural education; but later on, with a rather different emphasis, he lays the blame for rural school problems on "a system brutally uneducational," a system whose authors were "uneducated but learned."

The volume covers everything from elementary school to teacher-training college. It discusses buildings, parents, teachers, pupils, curriculum, adults, control, reorganization, finance. A great deal is made of the war experience, and of the removal of urban children to rural surroundings and schools. In the main the point of view is "progressive," but for all his desire to make the curriculum functional, the author seems to accept the "progressive" proposals in each area he considers without recognizing that at times they conflict. Most

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### CONTENTS FOR NOVEMBER 1945

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Carolina, Syracuse and Wisconsin.....*John M. Gaus*

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American rural educators would agree that rural schools should have a "rural idiom" rather than a "rural bias," but they would wonder what had become of this idea when they read the discussion of vocational education, which, among other things, leaves out of account the fact that many rural children not only do but must migrate to cities. Their own experience would not corroborate Mr. Burton's contention that a school of the preferred size, caring for 300 children or even 240, would include an area too large for effective transportation. And most of them would dissent strongly from Mr. Burton's advocacy of homogeneous-ability grouping. For all its faults, however, the book gives a vivid picture of the problems, past and present, of rural education in England; and it will convince any reader that Mr. Dent, in his conceptually arranged volume on "education in transition," is justified in calling one of his chapters "Ferment."

The history of education in England from September 1, 1939, when the past disappeared, is viewed by Mr. Dent under the headings of disintegration, recuperation, adaptation and ferment. Necessarily,

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in his more complete account, he goes over in a general way some of the ground that Mr. Burton covers from the particular point of view of rural education. It is an interesting, at times exciting story of the war's effect on English education. It is a hopeful one also, for Mr. Dent reports a wider public interest in this area of life than ever before. The proposals that are now being seriously debated in England go farther, the author believes, than anything yet proposed in any country. They are based on a recognition of the interrelation and interdependence of all aspects of social life, on the conviction that "education is the basic activity of society" and "the main source of its strength or of its weakness." Mr. Dent voices a disturbing suspicion, however, that this recognition is not so clear as it should be among educationists.

The last chapter contains an excellent summary of the more important of the nearly one hundred reports and papers that have dealt with needed reforms in English education in the postwar period. Some of these, most in fact, are largely concerned with administrative

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CONTENTS, SEPTEMBER 1945, VOLUME xxxv

THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY.....	<i>F. A. Hayek</i>
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problems, dealing with such matters as raising the school age to 15 and then to 16, with standards, unified administration, equality of opportunity, the licensing and inspection of schools, and the expansion of adult education; on these matters all groups seem to agree. In a few reports the method of approach is to attempt to envisage the sort of society that will emerge after the war, and then to determine the sort of education such a society will need. This is the procedure that the author approves, but it is the more difficult and perhaps that is why it lacks concreteness. Even this approach belies the earlier idea that education can help to shape the society that is to come. Mr. Dent gives an impressive list of evidence to support his contention that great educational reforms are in the offing, though he fails to indicate that the present favorable climate of opinion may change if those concerned do not produce a plan at once sound in its sociological approach and concrete in its specific proposals.

EDMUND DE S. BRUNNER

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